The European Union counter-terrorism strategy origins, problems, and prospects by Kirkwood, Lea T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-12
The European Union counter-terrorism strategy
origins, problems, and prospects
Kirkwood, Lea T.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-TERRORISM 








 Thesis Advisors:   Maria Rasmussen 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy: 
Origins, Problems, and Prospects 
6. AUTHOR  Lea T. Kirkwood 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT  
The European Union (EU) published its first Counter-Terrorism Strategy in December of 2005. After four years of 
reacting to the major terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005, the EU has enacted a 
substantial body of counterterrorism measures across multiple functional areas. The implementation of these actions, however, has 
not always been consistent or timely, due to a number of issues, including public threat perception, concern over social tensions, 
and competing national priorities. These roadblocks to a successful counterterrorism policy were often discovered upon new 
terrorist attacks and a renewed evaluation of EU counterterrorist activity. After the London bombings, the United Kingdom held 
the EU Presidency and immediately set to work on a strategy to counter terrorism, both similar and subordinate to the 2003 
European Security Strategy, which specifically listed terrorism and weapons of mass destruction among the top five threats to the 
EU. The new strategy of 2005 outlines EU efforts over the long term and provides a tool for public information. Despite the EU’s 
embrace of its new strategy, the document has many shortcomings. Evaluation of this strategy against a series of counterterrorism 
best practices accumulated from the work of functional and scholarly experts shows several areas in which the effectiveness of this 
strategy to successfully affect terrorism is severely limited. In all, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy serves limited 
use as a strategy document, but does serve to guide the EU’s efforts in fighting terrorism, as well as deepen EU integration in 
security affairs and in justice and law enforcement.  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
111 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  European Union, terrorism, counterterrorism, combating terrorism, strategy, 
implementation, EU integration, threat perception, security affairs 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY: ORIGINS, 
PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 
 
Lea T. Kirkwood 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.E.D., Miami University, 1992 
M.B.A., Georgetown University, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) published its first Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 
December of 2005. After four years of reacting to the major terrorist attacks in the United 
States in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005, the EU has enacted a substantial 
body of counterterrorism measures across multiple functional areas. The implementation 
of these actions, however, has not always been consistent or timely, due to a number of 
issues, including public threat perception, concern over social tensions, and competing 
national priorities. These roadblocks to a successful counterterrorism policy were often 
discovered upon new terrorist attacks and a renewed evaluation of EU counterterrorist 
activity. After the London bombings, the United Kingdom held the EU Presidency and 
immediately set to work on a strategy to counter terrorism, both similar and subordinate 
to the 2003 European Security Strategy, which specifically listed terrorism and weapons 
of mass destruction among the top five threats to the EU. The new strategy of 2005 
outlines EU efforts over the long term and provides a tool for public information. Despite 
the EU’s embrace of its new strategy, the document has many shortcomings. Evaluation 
of this strategy against a series of counterterrorism best practices accumulated from the 
work of functional and scholarly experts shows several areas in which the effectiveness 
of this strategy to successfully affect terrorism is severely limited. In all, the European 
Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy serves limited use as a strategy document, but does 
serve to guide the EU’s efforts in fighting terrorism, as well as deepen EU integration in 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 
COMBATING TERRORISM ........................................................................1 
B. CURRENT LITERATURE ON EU APPROACHES TO 
COMBATING TERRORISM ........................................................................4 
C. NEED FOR ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY............................................................................6 
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................8 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS .....................................................................8 
II. EU COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITY BEFORE THE STRATEGY ...........11 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 
B. SURGES IN EU COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITY...........................11 
1. After 9/11 ............................................................................................12 
2. After Madrid ......................................................................................21 
3. After London ......................................................................................28 
C. CHALLENGES TO PROGRESS ................................................................31 
1. Implementation Hurdles ...................................................................32 
2. Public Support....................................................................................37 
3. Tracking and Tracing of Actions......................................................39 
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................42 
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY—
ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENT.........................................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B. INTENT ..........................................................................................................45 
C. THREAT PERCEPTION .............................................................................49 
D. FOUR COUNTERTERRORISM PILLARS ..............................................52 
E. MEMBER STATE RESPONSIBILITY......................................................56 
F. KEY PRIORITIES ........................................................................................58 
G. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY .......................................................59 
H. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................60 
IV. STRATEGIC POTENTIAL .....................................................................................61 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................61 
B. THEORY—STRATEGY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND POLICY ...........61 
C. UPHOLDING ESPOUSED PRINCIPLES..................................................63 
D. GOAL..............................................................................................................65 
E. THREAT.........................................................................................................66 
F. CATASTROPHIC THREATS .....................................................................67 
G. POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT..........................................67 
H. INTELLIGENCE...........................................................................................70 
I. CENTRALIZED CONTROL.......................................................................70 
J. DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION AND COORDINATION ..................72 
 viii
K. MULTIFUNCTIONAL APPROACH .........................................................73 
L. MULTILATERAL APPROACH.................................................................74 
M. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................75 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................77 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................77 
B. ORIGINS OF THE STRATEGY .................................................................77 
C. PROBLEM AREAS.......................................................................................78 
D. STRATEGIC PROSPECTS .........................................................................79 
1. Evidence of Strategic Potential .........................................................79 
2. Missing Pieces.....................................................................................80 
3. Future Prospects ................................................................................81 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................85 











I have many people to thank for the completion of this thesis. First and foremost, I 
absolutely must express my appreciation to Professor Maria Rasmussen, our local 
“counterterrorism guru” and professor extraordinaire, who demands excellence at every 
turn and pushes us to be better than we think we can be. I also must thank Professor 
Rafael Biermann for his untiring advocacy of transatlantic relations, bridging the 
American and European mindsets. Both of these professors provided the critical 
guidance, although from different perspectives, which made this thesis possible.  
I convey my sincere appreciation to Professor Donald Abenheim for his support 
and counsel, in a multitude of endeavors, to a fellow “Europeanist.” I thank Professor 
Boris Keyser for his encouragement throughout the year, building my confidence at every 
turn. I thank Professor Brian Swanland for helping me to arrive at this thesis topic, after 
many previous formulations and dead ends. I am very grateful to my sister for her 
empathy and sanity checks, and to my mother and stepfather for their prayers and 
checkups. I am grateful to Edna for providing unending inspiration and wisdom; she was 
truly a darling. Finally, I am grateful to good friends and to my fellow thesis-writing 
comrades, Paul Nosek, Laurel Burkel, and Darwina Bugarin among others, for their 



























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMBATING 
TERRORISM 
European nations have a long history of terrorism within their borders. They 
likewise have substantial counterterrorism lessons learned and the resulting national 
legislation to combat terrorism according to their experiences.1 Most European nations 
have also embarked upon the path of integration within the European Union (EU). This 
integration has accelerated since the end of the Cold War, with the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty of European Union (TEU) in 1992 and subsequent treaties to enable 
deeper integration.2 The threat of terrorism demonstrated in the attacks in the United 
States in 2001, in Madrid in 2004, and in London in 2005, has elevated the visibility and 
importance of the fight against terrorism to the EU level. Thus, the deepening integration 
of the EU has also come to include the collective fight against terrorism. However, the 
EU as an institution is not set up to allow a cohesive response to terrorism; it must rely on 
the Member States to enact and implement policy. Any EU effort to fight terrorism has, 
therefore, to be agonizing and time-consuming, indeed the result of a delicate 
compromise.  
The EU published its first strategy for fighting terrorism in December 2005.3 
Before, the EU pursued counterterrorism policies through collective statements about 
terrorism and coordinated actions to strengthen intra-institutional and international efforts 
to fight terrorism. The newly published Strategy should bring form and focus to these 
efforts. As such, the ability of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy to function as a 
“strategy” is of key concern. An analysis of this document is necessary to outline the 
ways and means that the EU employs in the fight against terrorism to “make Europe 
                                                 
1 Paul Gallis, Summary of “European Counterterrorist Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in 
the First Year After September 11,” Congressional Research Service, RL31612, October 17, 2002. 
2 Subsequent treaties include the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and the Treaty of Nice in 2003. 
“Treaties and Law,” European Union website, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (accessed 
November 16, 2006). 
3 Council of the European Union, Presidency and the Counterterrorism Coordinator, “The European 
Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Document 14469/4/05 REV 4, November 30, 2005, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf (accessed November 26, 2006). 
2 
safer.”4 Understanding the statements and measures from the collection of EU 
agreements preceding the Counter-Terrorism Strategy will lay out its antecedents. 
Furthermore, tracing the momentum and direction of EU counterterrorism efforts in the 
wake of major terrorist attacks will provide a basis for judging the utility of the EU 
Strategy and the activities that might follow. Challenges to progress, including 
implementation and coordination issues, will further complete the setting, identifying 
gaps in the EU scheme. Finally, an evaluation of this Strategy against an array of 
benchmarks created from decades of experience in fighting terrorism will provide a 
meaningful assessment of the prospects for this Strategy to affect the fight against 
terrorism. The examination of origins, implementation issues, and expectations from this 
initial Counter-Terrorism Strategy will indicate its significance or relevance in the EU’s 
fight against terrorism.  
As a published strategy document, the European Union’s Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy provides insights into how the EU members intend to fight terrorism together. 
Since the EU is a supranational institution and not a sovereign state and since the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and its Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) pillar are still, though decreasingly, based mainly on intergovernmental 
cooperation, the question of how twenty-five sovereign Member States intend to plan and 
work together becomes all the more important and convoluted. It is a perplexing matter 
for both insiders and observers alike. Insiders, working within the Union, have 
participated in and facilitated the process, as events have unfolded and interaction has 
increased. Outside observers include both European citizens watching the interplay 
between their national governments, and non-EU organizations and partner nations who 
have not shared the same experience of working together in a supranational organization. 
Thus, this Strategy should prove useful to distill to all parties where the EU is going as a 





                                                 
4 Council, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 14469/4/05 REV 4, 2.  
3 
on the world stage with international partners. This Strategy statement is of paramount 
importance since, as a core element of the “West,” Europe is a prime target of 
transnational terrorism.5  
This Strategy is an important component of the overarching European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP), with the European Security Strategy6 (ESS) of December 
2003 serving as a guiding or framework document. As such, the ESS serves to reinforce 
Europe’s standing in international politics. Since the end of the Cold War, the members 
of the EU have embarked on a path towards designing a CFSP, thus becoming a stronger 
and more viable actor on the world stage, economically, politically, and militarily—
although to differing degrees. Europe is increasingly exercising its “voice” through the 
EU, creating overarching strategies and collaborative mechanisms at the 
intergovernmental level, including in the field of counterterrorism. By publishing a 
strategy, the intended message is to present the EU as a major actor in the fight against 
terrorism. However, the fact that the Member States are still the Principals and the EU the 
Agent, using the EU as an instrument to coordinate their internal and external security 
policies, undermines the prospects for this effort. The intention of this Strategy as a 
catalyst or as a consolidator for the EU members should be investigated to more clearly 
determine what can truly be expected from such a document and its signatories.  
The Counter-Terrorism Strategy continues Europe’s efforts to fight terrorism 
through multilateral channels, but remains, as other EU endeavors, entirely subject to 
implementation by the Member States. Efforts at the institutional level reveal a tenuous 
balance between the desired collective European action and national prerogatives. 
Documenting a plan under these conditions seems uncertain in any true measure as a 
strategy, or in successfully fighting terrorism. The true test is the ongoing translation of 
strategy to the operational and tactical levels, over which the EU has little control. 
Nonetheless, an overarching strategy could provide a strong, collective, if not complete, 
counterterrorism roadmap. However, this “late” Counter-Terrorism Strategy, developed 
                                                 
5 Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New 
York: Random House, 2002), 138.  
6 Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,” 
December 12, 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed November 
13, 2006). 
4 
only after four years of counterterrorism action plans, seems to offer little in the way of 
strategic underpinning or future direction. Such efforts are at best a step forward on the 
path to a truly collective EU counterterrorism effort.  
B. CURRENT LITERATURE ON EU APPROACHES TO COMBATING 
TERRORISM 
Prior to December 2005, there was no published strategy document on how the 
EU was to fight terrorism. The EU had created guiding documents in the form of 
declarations, action plans of ongoing cooperative activities, or statements made by EU 
officials. While the EU did publish its European Security Strategy in 2003 that addressed 
terrorism as a key threat to Europe,7 there was no immediate follow-up to better address 
this security risk.  
In the years between the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the publishing of this 
Strategy, there have been three schools of thought regarding the EU and terrorism: the 
internal camp, the naysayers, and the integrationists. The internal camp, 
intergovernmentalists within the EU and specifically from the office of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator within the European Council, repeatedly stressed that terrorism is 
a large problem for Europe and the “West” as a whole, but that implementation and 
effectiveness of any counterterrorism measure rested squarely on the shoulders of EU 
Member States. The EU acted only as a facilitator.8 From this point of view, the EU has 
both accepted its limited power and responsibility for effective policy, and accepted 
Member State authority by advocating the primacy of national autonomy in security 
affairs. Furthermore, this position could be deemed a more modest approach from a 
supranational institution, recognizing its own limitations to affect progress in the fight 
against terrorism.  
The second position is that of the naysayers. This group advocated that while EU 
policy for counterterrorism is a noble idea, it is essentially a “paper tiger,” impotent to 
effect any real change and stop terrorism on the continent. This group includes scholars 
such as Paul Wilkinson, Oldrich Bures, Gustav Lindstrom, and Ferruccio Pastore, among 
others; as well as news media outlets, like the British Broadcasting Company (BBC),                                                  
7 Council, “A Secure Europe,” 5.  
8 Gijs de Vries, “The European Union’s Role in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 16 (2005), 7-8. 
5 
who purport that the EU is practically hamstrung by its own institutional structure and by 
its lack of collective political will.9 This position rested partially on the fact that the EU is 
not a unitary actor with the power to ensure implementation of actions. EU 
counterterrorism efforts also do not fit strictly within one pillar of EU policy. 
Counterterrorism actions range across two of the three pillars of the EU, the second pillar 
of CFSP and the third pillar of JHA. These two pillars are organized to facilitate 
intergovernmental coordination and cooperation.10 Unlike the first pillar of the Economic 
Communities which does not require unanimous decisions to enact economic policy,11 
the second and third pillars both require consensus among all members. However, the EU 
holds no real power to enforce these measures, despite their unanimous agreement. This 
position also reflects the notion that EU decisions do not necessarily produce uniform 
understanding and implementation. Consensus as the “lowest common denominator” 
approach will not likely garner significant gains in the fight against terrorism.  
The third position is supported by those integrationists who believed in the 
benefits and potential of a more integrated Europe. This group includes proponents such 
as Paul Gallis, Louis Golino, and Michael Jacobson; and seconded by media outlets such 
as EurActiv, an independent media portal for EU affairs, that advocate that the EU is 
increasing its role in counterterrorism for the long haul and attempting to muster its 
                                                 
9 See Oldrich Bures, “EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
18, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 57-78; Kirsty Hughes, “The EU’s Jumbled Anti-terror Plan,” BBC News, 
December 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4529174.stm (accessed June 5, 2006); 
Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt, Facing Terrorism: European Perspectives and Strategies (Paris: 
EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004); Ferruccio Pastore, Jörg Friedrichs, and Alessandro Politi, Is There 
a European Strategy against Terrorism? A Brief Assessment of Supra-national and National Responses 
(Rome: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2005); and Paul Wilkinson, International Terrorism: The 
Changing Threat and the EU’s Response, Chaillot Paper no. 84 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 
2005). 
10 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1996), 274-5; and Brian Cassidy, “EURIM Guide to Decision-Making in the European Union 
after Amsterdam,” European Informatics Market, http://www.eurim.org/EURGUIDE.html (accessed 
September 7, 2006). 
11 In the first pillar, a “qualified majority voting” scheme was adopted to facilitate development of the 
single European market. This scheme does not require consensus but instead uses a formula of weighted 
voting rights allocated to the Member States and recognizes rule of the majority of the votes. Voting rights 
are not assigned by any quantifiable statistics. Thus, QMV does not necessarily correlate to a majority of 
Member States or a majority of the EU populations. Euroknow: A Concise Encyclopedia of the European 
Union, s.v. “Qualified Majority Voting,” http://www.euro-know.org/dictionary/q.html (accessed November 
13, 2006). 
6 
(collective) political will for greater effectiveness.12 These integrationists claim that EU 
common actions and policies have been and continue to be critical to the continued 
deepening of EU integration. They further posit that the combined efforts of the Member 
States are furthering pan-European opportunities to fight terrorism as well as organized 
crime throughout the Union. Their notion of increasing integration also in this field is 
vital to the ongoing expansion of a web of capabilities that would preserve national 
prerogatives towards fighting terrorism within national boundaries, but would also 
develop the EU as a community of nations that together enact a real force to combat 
terrorism. 
The lone voice to address the implications of the EU Strategy document since its 
release was a previous British government official and current professor, David Omand. 
He advocates the critical need for a strategy in fighting terrorism. He further notes that in 
the wake of the London bombings and during the British Presidency, this EU Strategy 
was at least a way for Britain to “play the quiet strategist” to vector the fight against 
terrorism in the days following Europe’s second large terrorist attack.13 The fact that 
there have been no significant evaluations of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy since its 
publication could mean that this vector was either too “quiet” or not meriting significant 
evaluation. The significance of this Strategy remains altogether unexplored.  
C. NEED FOR ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY  
Since publishing this first official Counter-Terrorism Strategy, there has been 
virtually no political or academic debate on the document now that it is down on paper. 
There has been no evaluation of the continuity of purpose or discussion about the goals 
                                                 
12 See Gallis, “European Counterterrorist Efforts”; Louis R. Golino, “Europe, the War on Terrorism, 
and the EU’s International Role,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 8, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 61-72; 
Michael Jacobson, “The Bush-EU Meeting: More Than a Symbolic Gesture on Counterterrorism?,” 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch no. 959, February 17, 2005, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2257 (accessed November 26, 2006); and 
various EurActiv reports and informational pages, to include: “EU to Streamline Anti-terrorism Strategy,” 
March 19, 2004, http://www.euractiv.com/en/justice/eu-streamline-anti-terrorism-strategy/article-114843 
(accessed June 6, 2006); “Terrorism Threat: Much Talk but How Much Action?,” March 8, 2005, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/justice/terrrorism-threat-talk-action/article-136504 (accessed June 6, 2006); 
and “Anti-terrorism Policy,” May 28, 2006, http://www.euractiv.com/en/justice/anti-terrrorism-
policy/article-136674 (accessed May 28, 2006). 
13 David Omand, “Countering International Terrorism: The Use of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 4 
(Winter 2005-2006), 111.  
7 
and objectives of this Strategy. Is it assumed just “declaratory”? Is it assumed correct? 
Does it change anything? Is it more than the summing up of previous policy statements? 
Will it actually serve as a guiding document for the future counterterrorism efforts of the 
twenty-five Member States? Would it even have been pursued as aggressively if the 
United Kingdom had not been attacked and if the United Kingdom had not held the EU 
Presidency in the six months following the trigger event? The lack of response seems to 
indicate a broad nonchalance about this subject as a whole. This could be expected from 
the public and perhaps the media, since only a relatively small percentage of Europeans 
have viewed terrorism among the top two issues facing their respective nations.14 
However, there also lacks an international and academic discussion. What can be 
expected of such a strategy under these conditions?  
In addition to the important implications for how this Strategy may influence 
future counterterrorism policy, there is also an academic value. Analyzing and evaluating 
this Counter-Terrorism Strategy adds another layer of analysis in multiple disciplines, in 
security studies as a whole, and within the areas of counterterrorism and supranational 
institutions. While the EU’s effort to fight terrorism has been the subject of much 
scholarly literature, to date, there has been little actual analysis of the Strategy document 
since published in 2005. Analyzing the origins and evolution of this Strategy, as well as 
the document’s content itself, paired with an evaluation against well-established 
counterterrorism lessons, will provide an appraisal that has heretofore not been 
accomplished. This critical analysis will contribute to the study of EU counterterrorism 
efforts by making an evaluation of how well the EU publication may live up to its claim 
as a “strategy.” This will also provide academic value in determining the significance of 
this Counter-Terrorism Strategy as to enhance strategic studies, and thus, contribute to 
future strategy formulation and effectiveness.  
 
                                                  
14 From 2003 to 2006, between 10-19 percent of Europeans named terrorism as one of the two most 
important issues facing their nation. European Commission, “Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the 
European Union,” Standard Eurobarometer no. 59 (Spring 2003), 7; no. 60 (Autumn 2003), 9; no. 61 
(Spring 2004), 22; no. 62 (Autumn 2004), 23; no. 63 (Spring 2005), 25; no. 64 (Autumn 2005), 20; and no. 




This thesis will evaluate the implications for the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
by comparing the Strategy to established benchmarks. EU efforts will be used as a case 
study, focusing on progression and scope of action. Official EU documents will be 
analyzed by content, through agreements adopted, language used, timing and context, and 
scope and implementation of actions. Documents will include declarations, framework 
decisions, common positions, press statements, action plans and updates, implementation 
reports, strategies and preceding negotiations thereof, Council minutes, opinion polls, 
terrorist event reports, and other contributing documents from the European Commission 
and the European Parliament. The content of the Strategy document will be analyzed 
according to language, scope, context, and relation to preceding EU actions. The EU 
counterterrorism approach will then be compared to benchmark criteria for 
counterterrorism strategy as gleaned from the study of historical experiences and the 
accumulated lessons learned. The results of this analysis will define the strengths and 
weaknesses of this Strategy and its prospects to combat terrorism. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis steps through the evolution of EU counterterrorism efforts, then 
analyzes the actual Strategy, and ends with an evaluation of the approach against 
benchmark criteria for counterterrorism strategy. To begin, Chapter II outlines the actions 
of the EU immediately following each of the three major terrorist attacks: in 2001 in the 
United States, 2004 in Madrid, and 2005 in London. Each attack heralded a surge of 
activity by the EU in enacting increased and broader cooperative measures to fight 
terrorism. However, the implementation of these expansive actions encountered some 
problems. The challenges impeding implementation will be highlighted, including delays 
due to differences in threat perception, political will, concern over social tensions, and 
national bureaucratic processes. Adding to the challenges in implementation are shifts in 
public opinion, and problems in tracking and tracing the significant number of actions 
across evolving EU objectives and among at first fifteen, then twenty-five EU Member 
States.15 Chapter III evaluates the Strategy document itself, reviewing its intent, 
                                                 
15 The EU had fifteen member nations until 2004, when ten new members joined, bringing its ranks to 
twenty-five. “European Union Member States,” European Union website, 
http://europa.eu/abc/governments/index_en.htm (accessed November 7, 2006). 
9 
evaluation of the threat, the methods planned to affect terrorism, responsibility for and 
implementation of measures, as well as the oversight of EU efforts to be provided by the 
array of EU institutions and agencies. In Chapter IV, a range of benchmark criteria is 
introduced from scholars and experts in the field of counterterrorism. These criteria are 
compared against the EU Strategy and its accompanying actions to determine alignment 
with lessons learned and best practices. Finally, a conclusion of how well the EU 
document and approach fit as a strategy is provided, outlining both strengths and 
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II. EU COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITY BEFORE THE 
STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The EU increased its counterterrorism activity in the four years between the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the formulation of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. While 
work has been ongoing among the different EU institutions and Member States, there 
have been times when the level of activity surges, adding more counterterrorism actions 
to existing EU measures and broadening into new cooperative arenas. There also have 
been times in which the level of activity seems to decrease and implementation lags. 
Beginning with the attacks on the United States in 2001, and following suit after the 
attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, the EU reaction to these events surges 
at each point and tends to level off or lag after some time has passed. This chapter 
reviews each of these surge periods and the different mechanisms that the EU included in 
its approach to fight terrorism. The chapter then reviews some of the challenges created 
from the surges in activity, such as Member State follow-through in implementing EU 
measures at the national level, waning public support, and the complexity of keeping 
track of the numerous EU activities. As the chapter concludes, the reactive nature of the 
EU in fighting terrorism16 will prove unmistakable and will confirm the need for a 
continuous and consistent approach to combat terrorism.  
B. SURGES IN EU COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITY 
The greatest surges in EU activity to fight terrorism have occurred in the periods 
immediately following a major terrorist attack in the West. These surges have included 
declarations made by the EU Council stating the EU approach, cooperative actions to 
enact this common approach to terrorism, and supplemental actions taken to increase 
information flow and consistency across the Union. “The prevalence of a ‘sense of 
urgency’ pattern which had dominated decision-making”17 following each attack is 
                                                 
16 Gustav Lindstrom, “The EU’s Approach to Homeland Security: Balancing Safety and European 
Ideals,” in Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches, ed. Esther Brimmer, 
(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006), 117. 
17 Monica den Boer, 9/11 and the Europeanisation of Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment, 
Policy Paper no. 6 (Paris: Notre Europe, 2003), 22. 
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representative of the distinctly reactive nature of the EU in addressing terrorism.18 “There 
are pressures for collective action”19 to push EU leaders to reach agreements and 
common positions; pressures brought to bear by the death and destruction of terrorism. 
The surges of reaction to terrorism culminated in the creation of an EU-wide Strategy to 
combat terrorism.  
1. After 9/11 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States, the EU embarked 
upon several initiatives to fight terrorism. These initiatives included a plan of action to be 
taken by Member States and within EU institutions to fight terrorism;20 agreement on a 
definition of what constitutes terrorism and the individuals and groups who perpetrate 
these acts,21 which had theretofore not been done within the EU;22 and the adoption of a 
framework decision to outline the EU’s approach to terrorism23 in support of the TEU 
commitment to create an “area of freedom, security, and justice.”24 As will be discussed, 
the activity after these actions significantly decreases, concluding the first surge of 
counterterrorism activity. 
Ten days after the attacks, following an extraordinary session of the EU Council 
to “give political orientations for EU Strategy” to fight terrorism,25 the EU announced its 
support to the United States, pledged its cooperation in fighting terrorism, and stated its 
                                                 
18 Lindstrom, “The EU’s Approach,” 117. 
19 Karen E. Smith, “EU External Relations,” in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 242. 
20 Council of the European Union, “Conclusions and plan of action of the Extraordinary European 
Council meeting on 21 September 2001,” Document SN 140/01, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf (accessed November 26, 2006), 1-3. 
21 “Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism (2001/931/CFSP),” Official Journal of the European Communities, L344 (December 28, 2001): 
93-96. 
22 Harald Müller, Terrorism, Proliferation: A European Threat Assessment, Chaillot Paper no. 58 
(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 5. 
23 “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),” Official 
Journal of the European Communities, L164 (June 22, 2002): 3-7.  
24 “The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C325 (December 24, 2002), 11. 
25 Michael Emerson and Daniel Gros, Issues for Europe—Post-11 September, Policy Brief no. 8 
(Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001), 7.  
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intention to “step up its action against terrorism.”26 From this extraordinary meeting, the 
Council also approved a Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism. This action plan 
highlighted five key areas on which the EU and its Member States would focus its 
cooperative efforts.27 This action plan came very quickly on the heels of the attacks, quite 
possibly because it did not need to start from scratch. Some in the EU began thinking 
about combating terrorism before the 9/11 attacks. At the Tampere European Council, 
15-16 October 1999, the Council mentioned joint investigative teams as a means to fight 
terrorism and called for breaking down extradition barriers.28 At the Santa Maria da Feira 
European Council, 19-20 June 2000, the Council “expressed [their] abhorrence” for 
terrorist acts and vowed to “reinforce” and “enhance” cooperation in fighting terrorism.29 
In early 2001, the European Parliament commissioned a report to outline what an 
appropriate EU role in the fight against terrorism would look like. The recommended role 
included adopting baseline criminal definitions and punishments for those deemed 
terrorist; following up on Conclusion 35 of the Tampere European Council regarding 
extradition barriers; creating a “European search and arrest warrant”; and establishing 
mutual recognition procedures among Member States for criminal matters.30 This 
Parliamentary Report was deemed a first step in collectively addressing what the EU 
described as the new international terrorism.31 These pre-9/11 EU considerations likely 
served as a convenient starting point for post-9/11 actions.  
The first plan included the preceding EU actions which were already in progress 
or under consideration, but “their practical implementation was painfully slow.”32 In 
addition, the plan of action also included existing United Nations’ (UN) conventions 
                                                 
26 Council, “Conclusions and Plan of Action,” SN 140/01, 1. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Council of the European Union, “Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions,” October 15-
16,1999, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm (accessed November 5, 2006). 
29 Council of the European Union, “Santa Maria da Feira Presidency Conclusions,” June 19-20, 2000, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm (accessed November 5, 2006). 
30 Graham R. Watson, “Report on the Role of the European Union in Combating Terrorism 
(2001/2016 (INI)),” Document A5-0273/2001, July 12, 2001, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/omk/sipade3?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-
0273+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=1&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y (accessed November 26, 2006), 
18.  
31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Bures, “EU Counterterrorism Policy,” 59.  
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against terrorism, which were still in need of either ratification or implementation by EU 
member states.33 However, the action plan went beyond the baselines provided and 
included the following measures:  
1. Enhancing police and judicial cooperation: (a) introduce a European arrest 
warrant and adopt a common definition of terrorism, (b) draw up a common list of 
terrorist organizations and presumed terrorists, and ( c) immediately share useful data 
regarding terrorism with Europol and set up a specialist anti-terrorism team; 
2. Developing international legal instruments—immediately implement all 
existing international conventions against terrorism; 
3. Putting an end to the funding of—take necessary measures to combat financing 
of terrorist activities, including following the money laundering directive, freezing assets, 
and ratifying of the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; 
4. Strengthening air security—take necessary measures to strengthen air transport 
security; and 
5. Coordinating the EU’s global action—the General Affairs Council will assume 
the role of coordination and provide impetus for fighting terrorism, including reporting at 
the next Council meeting.34 
The actions that broke new ground for EU cooperation included: naming terrorists 
and their supporting organizations, specifying terrorist financing as a requirement for 
fighting terrorism, and underscoring the obvious need, in the wake of 9/11, for the 
strengthening of air security. The breadth of this action plan created a veritable 
“inventory of counterterrorism measures, activities, and instruments of the EU.”35 
Finally, the last objective for this action plan called for “global action,” implying that the 
EU efforts are not limited only to actions of the EU member states.36 These new guiding 
                                                 
33 Council, “Conclusions and Plan of Action,” SN 140/01, 1-3; and Kristin Archick, “Europe and 
Counterterrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service, 
RL31509, October 15, 2004, 2.  
34 Council, “Conclusions and Plan of Action,” SN 140/01, 1-3.  
35 Doron Zimmerman, “The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal,” Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 2 (March-April 2006): 127. 
36 Council, “Conclusions and Plan of Action,” SN 140/01, 1-4.  
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principles for EU counterterrorism efforts were significantly more proactive and required 
greater cooperation than any agreements or recommendations made before 9/11. Spurred 
on by the tremendous impact of the United States attacks, these steps showed a desire for 
more action in fighting terrorism within the EU by further strengthening Member States’ 
integration and a demonstration that the EU “can take radical action quickly.”37  
The EU published another “declaration” on 19 October 2001.38 This declaration 
largely reiterated the EU’s previous stance and referenced the actions that had already 
begun under the five objectives listed in the action plan. It went on to request immediate 
implementation of the activities listed in the action plan.39 While all these items had been 
set in motion, this declaration desired their implementation faster and more emphatically 
than had previously been declared. It is believed that this restatement in more pressing 
and deliberate terms was deemed necessary because of other international activities 
following 9/11. Two other international organizations had taken steps in addressing 
terrorism. First, the “UN had entered the fray,” creating new resolutions on information-
sharing and terrorist financing. Second, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
had invoked Article 5, confirming that the attacks on the United States were considered 
an attack against all NATO members. The United States and coalition partners had also 
begun its campaign to eliminate the Al Qaeda organization in Afghanistan.40 This wave 
of support for the United States and against the terrorists might have caused the Council 
to re-evaluate the EU’s initial response and restate the EU’s intentions more 
emphatically.  
In December 2001, the EU agreed to a definition of terrorism and a list of 
terrorists and terrorist organizations. This was the first such agreement made by the EU, 
                                                 
37 Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap, Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice in 
an Enlarged European Union (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2002), 2.  
38 Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the European 
Union and the President of the Commission: Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks and the Fight against 
Terrorism,” Document SN 4296/2/01 REV 2, October 19, 2001, 
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39 Ibid., 2-3. 
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in effect determining what actions and which persons or groups are the targets for the 
“application of specific measures to combat terrorism.”41 It defined a terrorist act by the 
intention of the perpetrators, “which, given, its nature or its context, may seriously 
damage a country or an international organisation, as defined as an offence under national 
law.”42 It also contained an annex, naming twenty-nine individuals and thirteen groups.43 
This list was contentious from the start given that certain groups were included and others 
were not, which led to conclusions that it was heavily influenced by political issues.44 
The list was soon updated and, in 2005, grew to forty-five individuals and forty-seven 
groups deemed terrorist.45 
In June 2002, after almost nine months of review, debate, and revision, the EU 
completed work on the Framework Decision to Combat Terrorism. The decision                                                  
41 “Council Common Position,” L344/95, 93. 
42 This definition was quite broad and general in terms. In comparison, the U.S. Federal Code states: 
“Terrorism includes the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives.” The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism significantly expounds upon this legal 
definition, as well. In contrast, the UN does not have an agreed definition. Ibid; and “Title 28 Code of 
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Sec 0.85,” Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, Government Printing 
Office website, http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?type=simple;c=ecfr;cc=ecfr;sid=8d700a1bec6019be638273d2a765a2ca;idno=28;region=DIV1;q1=terr
orism;rgn=div8;view=text;node=28%3A1.0.1.1.1.27.1.1 (accessed November 30, 2006); White House, 
“National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf 
(accessed November 15, 2006); and “Definitions of Terrorism,” United Nations website, Office on Drugs 
and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html (accessed November 30, 2006). 
43 This list is considered modest in comparison to both the Terrorism Knowledge Base that lists 440 
active terrorist groups as of December 1, 2001, and the U.S. list that included twenty-eight terrorist groups 
in the month following the 9/11 attacks. Ibid., 95-96; “Groups,” The Terrorism Knowledge Base, 
http://www.tkb.org/AdvancedSearchResults.jsp?searchType=group&ideology=0&activity=Active&countr
yCd=0&grpAttacks=grpAttacksOptionAny&imageField.x=30&imageField.y=9 (accessed November 30, 
2006); and U.S. Department of State, “2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm (accessed November 5, 2006). 
44 The initial list did not include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas, or 
Hizballah in the Middle East, nor did it include the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey or the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. There was much outrage voiced from the 
victims of the violence enacted by these groups. The Colombian president was stupefied by this omission 
and quickly highlighted that the FARC had attacked a church, killing 199 civilians on the very day that the 
EU list was released. Bluma Zuckerbrot-Finkelstein, “European Attitudes Toward Hamas and Hizballah,” 
American Jewish Committee Counterterrorism Watch, 2006, 
http://www.ajc.org/site/c.ijITI2PHKoG/b.1070369/k.43C1/European_Attitudes_Toward_Hamas_and_Hizb
allah.htm (accessed May 28, 2006); and Joanne Mariner, “The EU, the FARC, the PKK, and the PFLP: 
Distinguishing Politics from Terror,” FindLaw’s Legal Commentary, May 13 2002, 
http://writ.news.findlaw/mariner/20020513.htm (accessed December 13, 2005). 
45 “Council Common Position 2005/847/CFSP of 29 November 2005 updating the Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Common 
Position 2005/725/CFSP,” Official Journal of the European Union, L314 (November 30, 2005): 41-47. 
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emphasized several preceding agreements that involved fighting terrorism, including 
conclusions from the Tampere and Santa Maria da Feira European Councils, as well as 
other counterterrorism documents, such as the Parliamentary Report on the Role of the 
European Union in Combating Terrorism and the Commission communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament, evaluating the progress towards the “area of 
freedom, security, and justice.”46 While including the December 2001 definition of 
terrorism, the Framework Decision also addressed penalties for those who commit and 
support terrorist acts, jurisdiction and prosecution, victims’ assistance, and 
implementation and reporting. The implementation article calls for compliance within 
eighteen months.47 The framework decision was very short in length, but obviously 
attempted to paint a broad brush to cover all aspects of counterterrorism avenues.  
The two plans of action published in December 2001 and July 2002, continued to 
strengthen the EU approach. Most notably, they expanded efforts to include active 
cooperation on police and judicial matters. Although an update to the action plan was 
published in November 2002, it did not show significant additions.48 To reinforce this 
leveling of activity and in fact show a lull in activity, which is discussed in the next 
section, there were no updates to the action plans published in 2003.49 There was ongoing 
                                                 
46 “Council Framework Decision,” L164, 3. 
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activity on the existing actions, as documented in the JHA meeting minutes,50 but it was 
not documented as agreed in six-monthly updates to the action plan, which were to be 
reported to the EU Council. Thus, the initial response to 9/11 produced “an 
unprecedented wave of policy interventions” representing a “giant leap forward” in EU 
cooperation and which “were suddenly regarded as more feasible and important” than 
before the attacks.51  
Although visibility on counterterrorism actions seemed to lag during 2003, there 
were other developments taking place within the EU Council. The attacks of 9/11 drove 
the EU to step up its efforts to make ESDP operational, such that the EU could be a more 
capable partner for the United States.52 However, the disagreements between Member 
States over U.S. action in Iraq created more disparity in how to proceed.53 It was clear, 
though, that the EU needed to re-evaluate its concept of security.54 The EU adopted the 
ESS in December 2003.55 This overarching Strategy was developed by the EU’s High 
Representative for the CFSP.56 It lists the five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, and organized 
crime. There is no priority assigned to these threats; although, it does state that WMD 
                                                 
50 Various items that were included in the action plans in 2002 continued to see progress in 2003. In 
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may well be the “greatest threat to our security.”57 And the combination of terrorists with 
WMD is “the most frightening scenario.”58 The remainder of the document addresses 
objectives for addressing these threats, building security for a more peaceful international 
society, and what these imply for policy.59 
The ESS was the “first strategic document ever of the EU” and was a “milestone 
for EU external action.”60 Providing a “comprehensive or holistic approach to 
security,”61 the ESS provides a sort of baseline authority for the Council to later develop 
other lower level strategies, such as one to counter terrorism. “Strategy should function as 
a tool for policymakers, as a set of guidelines for day-to-day policymaking.”62 The ESS 
provides a top-down approach to balance the bottom-up approach taken with the creation 
of the action plans. The ESS also supports the fifth objective made in the first action plan 
immediately after 9/11, as a global actor to “coordinate global action.”63 The themes of 
the ESS set a precedent for security-related endeavors within the EU, and built the EU’s 
confidence in this new arena.64 Although the ESS was much more broad-based than just 
counterterrorism issues, the Council’s focus on the development of this document could 
have contributed to the EU’s lack of attention to the counterterrorism action plan. Upon 
approving the ESS, the EU requested immediate follow-up in four key areas to support 
the implementation of this new Security Strategy, one of which was terrorism.65 As the 
first-ever EU Strategy, it lays the groundwork for future more targeted strategies.66  
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The creation of a baseline Strategy documenting the EU approach to security 
could be seen as “the Union gaining the physical ability and political confidence to use 
military means while still maintaining its overall character as a civilian actor.”67 
However, the content of the document leads to the conclusion that the ESS does not quite 
fit the traditional idea of a strategy, used most often with military strategy in mind, which 
is: 
To define actual goals and set up priorities to achieve policy objectives, 
describe which means can be used, and under what conditions, to fulfill 
that specific purpose. The ESS does not offer even the roughest guideline 
as to the situation in which EU forces could be called upon to operate.68  
The ESS does accomplish the critical task of gaining consensus on a European 
security agenda, but does so more as a strategic concept, vice an actual strategy.69 It also 
lists the current and expected threats to the EU, including terrorism and WMD. The ESS 
discussion of these threats is minimal, especially when compared to the National Security 
Strategy of the Unites States which discusses terrorism throughout the text.70 The EU 
threat assessment shall be reviewed more thoroughly in the next chapter. However, the 
ESS “is vague when it comes to the ends to be attained and virtually silent about how the 
capabilities can be used to exert influence.”71 Also with regard to exerting influence, the 
ESS looks to the Member States to choose how to use the means to deal with the threats. 
Thus, the challenge of the ESS lies more in the implementation preferences of the 
Member States,72 leaving the prospects of the ESS still questionable pending degree and 
success of implementation.  
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2. After Madrid 
On March 11, 2004, the commuter rail system in Madrid was attacked by radical 
Islamists during the morning rush hour, killing 191 people and injuring over 1,800.73 
Following the apparent lull (or diversion) in activity during 2003, the surge of activity 
after these attacks proved even more expansive than the surge in 2001/2002, showing a 
renewed EU dedication.74 Again, there was a declaration condemning the attacks and 
reaffirming the need to work together to fight terrorism, which included a Solidarity 
Clause affirming collective assistance to any EU nation attacked.75 There was also a 
revised and expanded action plan,76 a tracking mechanism for national implementation of 
actions,77 and a new post created within the EU Council Secretariat to coordinate 
counterterrorism efforts.78 Although the EU recognized the threat and felt the impact of 
the attacks on the United States, the attacks on Madrid (i.e., attacks on the EU homeland) 
compelled the EU community to focus greater attention on the issue.79  
As in 2001, the Council made a declaration of EU intentions against terrorism. 
This declaration again relayed the EU’s resolve to fight terrorism, offered support to 
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victims, and planned to build on existing cooperation.80 It referenced the newly penned 
ESS and its identification of terrorism as a key threat to the EU. It further called for the 
creation of new terrorism-specific “substrategies” and “for the development of an EU 
long-term Strategy to address all the factors which contribute to terrorism.”81 The 
declaration also urged Member States to “implement fully and without delay” the 
previously agreed legislative measures.82 This inclusion confirms that there were indeed 
challenges in transposing EU measures into national law, slowing down activity to fight 
terrorism, which is discussed later in this chapter. The declaration also called on the 
Council to consider further collective action with new and more detailed proposals, and 
laid out the new objectives for a revision of the action plan.83 Eighteen pages in total,84 
this declaration both expanded and deepened the EU approach to fighting terrorism. 
In addition, this declaration also included a Solidarity Clause against terrorism.85 
This clause not only claims that the EU Member States will work together to fight 
terrorism, but also that each member will “mobilize all available means, including 
military resources, if one of them is a victim of a terrorist attack.”86 This was considered 
a “powerful statement of solidarity against terrorism,”87 and was added to the December 
2004 action plan.88 This clause also echoed the EU Solidarity Clause in the proposed EU 
Constitution,89 affirming this commitment in the fight against terrorism. Since this clause 
also extends to military means, it could also be comparable to Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty for NATO, whose “swift implementation [following the attacks on 
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the United States] demonstrated [NATO’s] shared solidarity.”90 This new EU Solidarity 
Clause created a familiar standard within the context of terrorism for the EU institution 
and significantly enhanced the ESDP. 
Along with this Solidarity Clause, there was another marked increase in 
cooperative action. The declaration redefined the EU’s counterterrorism objectives. 
These included: 
1. To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts 
to combat terrorism;  
2. To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;  
3. To maximize the capacity within EU bodies and member States to 
detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks; 
4. To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective 
systems of border control;  
5. To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States 
to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; 
6. To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment 
into, terrorism; [and]  
7. To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third 
Countries where counterterrorist capacity or commitment to combating 
terrorism needs to be enhanced.91 
The next action plan realigned previous activity and created new actions along 
these seven strategic objectives. This document also merged all existing documentation 
on counterterrorism from various organizations into “one streamlined document—a 
useful step towards elimination of duplication of work.” The plan was “ambitious,”92 
reflecting the degree to which the attacks “injected a greater sense of urgency into EU 
efforts to boost police and judicial cooperation with the EU and improve EU external 
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border controls.”93 Intended to be a living document that would capture progress as a 
snapshot in time, the plan was to be updated and reported regularly.94  
The consolidated action plan was markedly different from its predecessors. It 
enveloped border security, consequence management, and third country havens into the 
realm of counterterrorism cooperation. It also embarked on a bolder path for the EU as a 
global actor in the fight against terrorism by “maximiz[ing] the capacity within EU 
bodies,” “enhanc[ing] the capability of the European Union,” and “target[ing] actions 
under EU external relations.” Another layer of detail was added by including EU bodies 
among those responsible for, and capable of, affecting counterterrorism efforts. The 
image of the EU as more of a “global actor” was thus bolstered, as stated in the ESS and 
in the initial framework decision after 9/11,95 vice the image of Europe as a “political 
pygmy,”96 as it has been criticized for its lack of effective power in the face of national 
prerogatives and protection of sovereignty. Under normal circumstances, such a 
suggestion to further empower the EU might have been dismissed by the Council; 
however, in the face of such deadly terrorist attacks on the EU proper, the Member States 
repeatedly agreed to expanded actions. The crisis of Madrid created an environment of 
fear whereby nations would agree to measures that would increase the power of the 
Union. While this agreement does not assume any degree of surrender of national 
sovereignty, it certainly opens the door to subtle shifts in European power distribution in 
the future.97  
In December 2004, approximately nine months after the Madrid attacks, there was 
more expansion of the action plan, although mostly to facilitate closer coordination.98 
One significant addition was the Hague Program. Between the June and December 2004 
plans, the Council approved the Hague Program on strengthening freedom, security, and 
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justice, which included the objective to “repress the threat of terrorism.”99 This was 
reflected in a new action to enhance information sharing.100 The plan also claimed 
completion of the EU’s first strategy to combat the terrorism of financing which was also 
approved by the Council in December 2004.101 It included reference to the Conceptual 
Framework on the ESDP, which was adopted by the Council in 2004.102 Intentions for an 
ESDP contribution to fighting terrorism from the 2002 Seville Council meeting included: 
aiding in conflict prevention and providing international assistance, sharing intelligence, 
and developing a common threat assessment.103 The Conceptual Framework adopted by 
the Council listed four main areas encompassing civilian and military actions: (1) 
prevention via crisis management and intelligence gathering; (2) protection of hard and 
soft targets; (3) response/consequence management; and (4) support to third countries.104 
While the ESDP can support the fight against terrorism, it is not perceived to be “at the 
core of [EU counterterrorism] efforts.”105 However, the ESDP is still evolving and it 
remains to be seen how this support materializes. Given Europe’s preference for 
nonmilitary measures, some observers suspect its contribution may be negligible.106 
Collectively, these additions represent the EU members’ follow-through on their 
promises of greater coordination to affect terrorism, but they also increased the scope of 
action significantly, where effective implementation, or even tracking, seems 
overwhelming. 
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To address the mass of required action, another change in the action plan 
following the attacks in Madrid was the inclusion of a tracking tool for national 
implementation. Member State transposition of EU measures into national law was 
“slow, poor, and inadequate”;107 many of the actions were yet to be implemented three 
years later when Madrid was attacked.108 The EU sought to highlight the lagging 
implementation by Member States and added a tally of national compliance—a 
“scoreboard.” This mechanism tracked the individual status of Member State 
implementation of EU decisions.109 Several entries show that implementation is 
incomplete because of varying Member State’s governmental processes.110 The 
scoreboard only generally relays, however, the reason for the implementation delay. 
Footnotes for actions that have not been fully implemented point to where legislation is in 
process; it does not delve into the potentially contentious realm explaining political or 
other reasons for nonimplementation. Overall, the use of the scoreboard raises the 
visibility of Member States’ progress in doing what they agreed to do.  
The EU also sought to increase oversight and accountability for these actions. 
After Madrid, the Council appointed its first Counterterrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries, 
to work under the EU High Representative, oversee the EU’s total counterterrorism 
effort, and report to the Council.111 The creation of this position was the result of the 
EU’s acknowledgement that measures had not been enacted as agreed in the 2002 
Framework Decision.112 Implementation had encountered delays due to slow national 
machinery, civil liberties concerns, resource limitations, and waning political support in 
the absence of an attack (at that time) on the homeland.113 “This was,” explains Kristin 
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Archick, “the key rationale for establishing a new EU Counterterrorism Coordinator 
tasked with overseeing and promoting member state compliance.”114  
Like criticism of other EU efforts at fighting terrorism, the creation of this 
position also garnered attention and questions about its potential efficacy: “Doubts about 
the function of the Coordinator arose at the outset when de Vries himself conceded that 
his role is restricted; and unless he has the same power as the member states in terms of 
control over police and other law-enforcement agencies, his office cannot work 
effectively.”115 Despite this attempt to create an overseer, herder, and synergist to the vast 
array of counterterrorism policies, the position came with limited staff and no authority to 
carry out the harmonization of efforts. Among the factors limiting his potential 
effectiveness are also inherent limitations of responsibility within the EU in fighting 
terrorism; difficulty in producing an EU threat assessment given Member States’ concern 
over sharing sensitive information; and existing bilateral relationships within the Union 
that sideline the coordinator.116 His success, therefore, lies entirely in his ability to 
persuade the Member States to “prioritize security and coordinate with other relevant 
actors.”117 The role of Counterterrorism Coordinator, while good in theory, is less 
promising when considering these factors that severely limit De Vries’ range of action to 
do his job. In a statement just one year after his appointment, De Vries “admitted that 
there is little still not enough cooperation between the member states on counterterrorist  
measures and there is little the EU can do without this.”118 The position of 
Counterterrorism Coordinator added accountability for tracking actions, but not for 
implementing actions.  
The attacks in Madrid prompted more activity to fight terrorism than ever before. 
The agreement on the Solidarity Clause and the creation of the Coordinator position 
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within the EU Council Secretariat signaled the EU’s intention for more concerted 
attention to both ongoing coordination and to potential cooperation in the wake of 
attacks. All the EU initiatives taken in response to the Madrid attacks revitalize its efforts 
to fight terrorism. However, some of the root causes for lagging implementation were not 
resolved by these innovations; overcoming them depends on the Member States. 
3. After London 
On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers attacked London’s public transit system 
during morning rush hour, killing fifty-two people and injuring more than 770.119 On the 
heels of the second major international terrorism attack in Europe, there were again a 
number of initiatives undertaken by the Council. First, there was another declaration 
decrying the attacks, upholding solidarity, and reiterating its determination and 
commitment to fight terrorism by accelerating implementation of the action plan and 
other previously agreed commitments.120 The implementation was to be reviewed at the 
December 2005 Council meeting, where a “reinforced” action plan was to be 
presented.121 This declaration also called for the development of a “global counter-
terrorism strategy,” although at the level of the UN.122 The response of the Council 
repeated largely what was declared since 9/11. Five years after the shock of 9/11, the EU 
believes that it has the right approach to collectively fight terrorism, but acknowledges 
that the approach needs improved execution.  
The London attacks came at the beginning of the EU six-month Presidency of the 
United Kingdom. Given the UK’s significant experience with terrorism, although 
different in nature than the threat posed by Al Qaeda, compounded by the attacks in its 
own capital, it was to be expected that the United Kingdom would take a more proactive 
position in combating the threat. Since the first EU actions after 9/11, UK public officials 
pressed for faster and more thorough action and cooperation against terrorism. For 
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example, David Blunkett, UK Home Secretary in 2001, “urged the EU to get on with 
introducing a draft of new counter-terrorism measures as quickly as possible.”123 After 
the Madrid attacks, the House of Lords EU Select Committee issued a report criticizing 
the convoluted array of EU counterterrorism measures, the delay in appointing a 
Europol124 director due to Member State “bickering,” and the weak role given to the new 
Counterterrorism Coordinator.125 Most recently, after the London attacks, British 
officials viewed the debate between security and civil liberties as “undermin[ing] the 
effort by the [EU] to form a collective front against terrorism.”126 A spokesman for the 
British government put it more bluntly: “the liberals who are holding things up need to 
ask themselves if they want the right to civil liberties or the right not to be blown up on 
the way to work.”127 Despite the UK’s determined attitude towards fighting terrorism, the 
UK EU Presidency would not be able to impart these national preferences on the EU, but 
it would at least allow the United Kingdom to guide the Strategy’s development.128 
Immediately following the attacks, the Counterterrorism Coordinator and the 
Council of Permanent Representatives to the European Council (Coreper)129 began 
discussions on how to update the EU’s approach.130 Within four months after the attacks, 
the EU Presidency and the Counterterrorism Coordinator presented a draft Counter-
Terrorism Strategy to the Coreper. The proposal “Towards a Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
for the European Union”131 was intended to fulfill two objectives: (1) create a longer-
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term approach for the EU to follow in the fight against terrorism, and (2) provide the 
public with a succinct explanation as to EU counterterrorism efforts. This intent would 
also prove useful in gearing national action towards the common goal.132 The aim was to 
complete negotiations on this proposal and present it to the Council at the close of the UK 
Presidency. Indeed, after several months of discussions and revisions, a final document 
was approved in December 2005, the end of the UK Presidency.133  
The new EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy encompasses a full range of actions to 
fight terrorism.134 It lays out a strategic commitment to fight terrorism, focusing activities 
around four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond.135 It also outlines the 
facilitating role of the EU and its “cross-cutting contributions” to the four pillars.136 It 
further introduces a rough notion of political oversight to be provided by a combination 
of EU bodies, including the Council, the European Parliament, and the European 
Commission, in cooperation with the Counterterrorism Coordinator.137 Basically, all 
major EU institutions would have some degree of responsibility for oversight of this 
Strategy to ensure accountability.138 This document will be evaluated in more depth in 
the next chapter.  
Due to the development of the new Strategy and the reworking of 
counterterrorism objectives, the update to the action plan was delayed. After the Strategy 
was approved, the action plan was reworked to align with the four pillars contained 
therein. The revised plan was released in February of 2006. This plan provided another 
major overhaul, although it was roughly the same size as before, indicating that most of 
the actions were previously included in the action plan, but not necessarily under the 
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same objective or to the same extent.139 One major update to the plan called for action on 
the newly adopted strategy to combat radicalization and recruitment, which was adopted 
in December 2005, the same month as the Counter-Terrorism Strategy.140 This was the 
second specific strategy that the EU approved, prior to the overall Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy. The initial Council declaration highlighted the need for a more concerted effort 
for implementation of existing actions and agreements. The lack of growth in the action 
plan items reflected this focus on consolidation. Given that four years had passed since 
the first EU plan of action and the agreed measures were already wide-ranging, 
continuing to focus on existing measures appeared more efficient. 
While the actions taken after the London bombings do not readily appear to be as 
significant as after the attacks in the United States and in Madrid, the surge in activity 
here has a different character. The adoption of the new Strategy is crucial. It represents a 
tremendous step towards further integration. It encompasses the wide range of previously 
taken EU actions and integrates the institutional and national contributions. It put all the 
concepts in one place for the first time. Indeed, it would likely fulfill the role intended as 
an explanatory document for public consumption and comprehension of EU 
counterterrorism efforts.141 Coming after the ESS and addressing the first threat stated 
therein, the Strategy to fight terrorism was the logical next step.  
C. CHALLENGES TO PROGRESS 
The vast measures taken by the EU in the surges of activity following the three 
major terrorist attacks in the past five years have placed a significant responsibility on 
Member States. There have been some social issues that made EU members disinclined 
to accept the reality of the threat. Public opinion during this time generally did not ascribe 
a high priority to fighting terrorism. The number and scope of EU measures to be 
transposed into national legislation were, and continue to be, enormous. Other issues also 
inflict stress on the implementation process. The administrative demands alone, of 
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tracking an effort of this magnitude and scope, have proven challenging. The 
compounding of issues of national sovereignty and status create a continuing challenge 
for the EU as its counterterrorism efforts evolve and mature.  
1. Implementation Hurdles 
The renewed fervor to combat terrorism in the wake of 9/11 overcame the 
stagnation that had plagued counterterrorism actions, “catapult[ing] these issues to the top 
of the European agenda.”142 There were initially high hopes that the majority of the EU 
measures would be transposed and enacted through Member State national laws within 
about a year.143 However, willingness of EU members to cooperate in fighting terrorism 
“does not always translate into common action.”144 Despite the post-9/11 surge, the 
activity soon languished. As mentioned earlier, there were no updates to the action plan 
for combating terrorism in 2003. While there was other work being done, both as 
documented in the JHA meeting minutes and in the release of the ESS at the end of 2003, 
the attention given specifically to terrorism seemed to fade as time passed and Europe 
distanced itself from the horror of 9/11. Thérèse Delpech observes: “The events of 11 
September moved all Europeans [and] military operations were far from over in 
Afghanistan. . . . [And yet] Europeans began to lose their focus.”145 There are several 
reasons for this loss of focus. Among the reasons noted by scholars for the decrease in 
counterterrorism activity in the 2003 time frame are: location of attacks, threat 
perception, potential social tension, national preferences, and national bureaucratic 
processes.  
First, even though Europeans felt 9/11 was an attack on the West and not only on 
the United States, the attacks had not taken place in Europe.146 Europeans were observers 
of what happened across the Atlantic—far from Europe—causing much less of an 
emotional impact than on the U.S. East Coast. Thus, the attacks were still not “local” to 
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the European populace. This failure to relate cultural proximity to potential physical 
proximity is also highlighted in that “even the fact that three of the four September 11 
suicide pilots were recruited from the heart of Europe did not generate the same sense of 
urgency in Europe that prevailed in the U.S.”147 Therefore, European leaders were not 
compelled to react as sharply to the attacks as did the United States.  
Second, the Europeans had enjoyed a “long peace” since 1945,148 believing this 
to be the most peaceful and prosperous period in Europe’s history.149 They had also 
fallen into a sense of deep relief after the end of the Cold War,150 which had caused 
enormous anxieties, among many Europeans, of Europe becoming a nuclear battlefield of 
superpower confrontation. With the enlargement of the EU and of NATO following the 
end of the Cold War, Europe had experienced tremendous community-building, whereby 
all nations had “equal rights and obligations—never in its history has Europe come this 
close to being whole and free.”151 It was hard to believe that they could fall prey to 
threats of such magnitude as they had lived under in the prior decades;152 that the post-
Cold War world could be “not safer, but potentially more dangerous.”153 Concerning 
threat assessment, terrorism was now also being addressed at the multinational level as 
opposed to exclusively within the individual nations. However, the general challenge of 
intelligence sharing between nations, much less between fifteen or twenty-five nations,154 
also contributed to the lack of a concrete EU threat assessment. Thus, the only EU-wide 
threat assessment was subjective, based upon individual perceptions and not upon a 
consolidated, detailed intelligence product.  
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Scholars also claim there are other practical reasons for the lull in activity. One 
claim is that the European leadership did not want to cause panic and potential ethnic 
tensions within Europe’s Muslim minorities155 by drawing much attention to the potential 
threat within national borders. The integration of nonnative minorities has challenged 
Europe for several decades, with Europe falling short time and again.156 Europe’s success 
with integrating minorities has been limited and these alienated minorities, particularly 
Muslim minorities, had perpetrated the terrorist acts in Madrid and London.157 This 
integration deficit in the European minority communities, including Muslim or Arab 
communities, could have played a part in convincing European leaders of the sensitivity 
of the issue. The pursuit of measures that could be seen as targeting EU minorities might 
stir up larger issues within their populations. The desire for stability and peace through 
conflict-avoidance, therefore, contributed to delays in measures which could have 
contributed to fighting terrorism, as they would also have impacted poorly integrated 
minorities in the same communities.  
Member States may also impede implementation for reasons of national 
preferences. Under the pressure of recent terrorist attacks, the EU was able to enact 
increasingly significant and far-reaching counterterrorism measures that before seemed 
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spikes in public concern over terrorism,159 resulted in a greater willingness to take steps 
in collective counterterrorism action. “Technicalities could not stand in the way of the 
‘new policy’.”160  
Italy’s reluctance to sign-on to the EU Arrest Warrant following 9/11 is a case in 
point. Spain had the EU Presidency for the first half of 2002, shortly after the attacks. As 
Spain had an active domestic terrorist element (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque 
Homeland and Freedom—ETA),161 it had a vested interest in encouraging cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism. Holding the EU Presidency, Spain was seen to engage in 
“plenty of arm twisting” with Italy, which was finally “publicly shamed into accepting” 
the EU Arrest Warrant.162 However, Italy’s national preference shone through when it 
was the last EU member to implement this action;163 doing so only after the London 
attacks (four years on) and under UK pressure to extradite a suspect in a failed suicide 
bombing of the London underground transit system.164  
Also impeding implementation is the sheer effort of creating legislation quickly 
among multiple national bureaucracies. “It is natural,” say Ferruccio Pastore et al., “for a 
structured cooperation among national administration[s] to require a long process.”165 
The momentum of 9/11 was lost by the time it took to fully transpose EU actions into 
national legislation and operating procedures.166 Once national legislation is set in 
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Terrorism,”in Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: A Transatlantic Dialogue, 
ed. C. Fijnaut, J. Wouters, and F. Naert (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 309. 
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motion, it can get “bogged down.”167 Thus, the implementation report of December 2005 
records several initiatives to have started in the national process, which are still not 
complete years after their agreement at the EU level. Even if each member does take the 
necessary measures in a timely manner, there remains “uneven implementation, leading 
to a heterogeneous impact on domestic criminal law and a differentiated implementation 
schedule.”168  
Delays can also be attributed to resource limitations, since social and economic 
priorities may trump counterterror efforts within national budgets.169 Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of EU measures is critically dependent on the capacity of the Member 
States to implement each measure.170 Each member’s interpretation of measures to be 
enacted171 leads to variations in national legislation. Thus, implementation at the national 
level has encountered many hurdles and will continue to do so because of differences in 
national preferences and national bureaucracies. 
These reasons coalesced to decrease activity in countering terrorism more than 
one year after 9/11. This finding is supported by EU actions to attain higher visibility of 
implementation, like the scoreboard172 measuring, tracking, and documenting national 
implementation and the creation of a Coordinator position to facilitate and track 
collective action.173 Despite specific insight into issues of national preference, the EU 
scoreboard and the work of the Counterterrorism Coordinator shows the EU’s initial 
evaluation of counterterrorism policy, beginning with the EU’s own ability to affect 
national implementation. 
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2. Public Support 
While the evolution of EU action plans lagged throughout 2003 due in part to 
implementation issues, the ebb and flow of public opinion in representative democracies 
has an additional impact on counterterrorism decision-making. The EU has its own 
polling mechanism, Eurobarometer, to maintain awareness of European public 
opinion.174 Overall, EU citizens feel that counterterrorism measures are best handled at 
the EU level,175 but terrorism is not seen as the top EU priority, relative to other 
concerns. In the two years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, between 89 and 91 
percent of the European population agreed terrorism should be an EU priority.176 This 
feeling continued but was perhaps better qualified in future surveys as Eurobarometer 
changed its survey methods. In 2004, Europeans were asked to mark from a prepared list 
the top three priorities upon which the EU should focus. The percentages indicating 
terrorism among these top priorities ranged between 19 and 27 percent, but never ranked 
above the fourth highest position of what the EU should consider a top priority.177 The 
issues that typically ranked higher include unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, 
the maintenance of peace and security in Europe, and organized crime and drug 
trafficking. While this question was not framed that way until 2004, the surveys show 
two spikes where higher percentages of people believed terrorism should be among the 
top three priorities for the EU. The two spikes occur immediately following the Madrid 
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and London attacks, garnering 27 and 23 percent respectively. Despite increases in 
concern for terrorism, these spikes in percentages did not change the overall standing of 
terrorism among the top priorities.178 Terrorism remained no higher than fourth place in 
the priority list. These data reflect increases in the EU population’s concern over 
terrorism immediately following terrorist attacks, but its overall priority among other 
issues remained the same.  
The ebbs and flows of public support for EU efforts in fighting terrorism are also 
reflected in how EU citizens think their own country should prioritize terrorism. Since the 
Spring of 2004, Eurobarometer has measured what Europeans think are the top two issues 
for their individual country. The aggregate of opinions for national priority of terrorism 
are similar to how Europeans prioritize terrorism in the EU. In the two and a half years 
that this question has been surveyed, combating terrorism has ranked as high as fourth 
and as low as eighth, garnering between 10 and 16 percent, as an EU average. Again, 
issues such as unemployment, the economy, and crime consistently rank higher.179 
Likewise, there have been two spikes raising the priority of terrorism. The first was in the 
fall of 2004, following the Madrid attacks, the second in the fall of 2005, following the 
London attacks.180 In the next six-monthly survey, following both the Madrid and 
London attacks, terrorism dropped back down in priority. Thus, there is a remarkable 
coincidence of increasing and waning national concerns about terrorism and the ebb and 
flow of EU action on terrorism.  
The data on threat perception of terrorism shows a similar disparity in the surveys 
conducted by Transatlantic Trends. While surveying less than half of the EU countries, 
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mostly Western European, the results show that between 94 and 96 percent of 
respondents feel terrorism is a top threat to Europe over the next ten years.181 However, 
when asked, in 2005 only, how likely the individual respondents felt they were to be 
personally affected by international terrorism (among others) the result was a much less 
resounding 51 percent.182 While Europeans do consider international terrorism a threat to 
Europe, far fewer consider this threat affecting their own personal safety.  
The lag in support for counterterrorism is equally significant for both the EU and 
Member States. Since it is the Member States that must implement the actions, a decline 
in public concern over terrorism may inhibit the willingness of national leaders to spend 
time and money on EU-agreed counterterrorism legislation as well as funding national 
contributions to EU institutions that conduct counterterrorism and coordination functions. 
However, the Member States must prioritize these activities and fully implement EU 
measures in order for the EU counterterrorism efforts to even have a chance at proving 
successful. Support of the public constituencies is essential to convince national 
legislatures that terrorism is a priority. However, given that the spikes in support of 
counterterrorism do not last long, the implementation may continue to experience jerks 
and starts. 
3. Tracking and Tracing of Actions 
The ability to keep track of a multitude of action items is also an essential 
challenge for the EU. The tracking of actions becomes increasingly more difficult when 
actions are lacking complete information, cannot be traced between action plans, and 
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when the action plan itself becomes too large and cumbersome.183 For many years, the 
action plans served as the only regularly updated document to track progress of agreed 
EU measures. Therefore, it would be advantageous to have a comprehensive document, 
with complete information for each item to tell the whole story of where the EU stands in 
implementing the plan. However, from the beginning, there were challenges in getting to 
a reliable level of information and accuracy, perhaps both for both information gathering 
and political sensitivities, The June 2002 action plan fell short in providing a 
comprehensive level of detail in that not all entries were complete.184 Some did not list 
forthcoming work.185 The lack of prescribed deadlines is also problematic, with vague 
projected completion dates, such as “urgent,” “ongoing,” or “none.”186 The level of detail 
provided does improve with subsequent plans. However, not all missing information is 
filled in, and it is more random and piecemeal.187 The incomplete nature of the entries 
attributes to the ongoing challenge of assessing status and implementation of the wide 
array of counterterrorism activities.  
The lack of continuity between action plans also impeded tracking of actions over 
the years. When action plan objectives change several times and actions are realigned 
under new objectives, there must be a way to show which items remain basically the 
same and which items are new. The actions cannot be easily traced between plans when 
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the basic numbering system shifts due to changing objectives.188 These shifts occur 
mostly in revised action plans immediately following major terrorist attacks and the 
accompanying surge in activity reinventing the EU approach.189 The absence of this 
tracing mechanism leads to confusion and endless searching to obtain a status update.  
Finally, the consolidation of actions made the action plan larger and more difficult 
to manage, and also led to less detailed information for each individual action. Although 
the objective of the action plans was to combine all actions into “one streamlined 
document,”190 it became too large and unfocused. In the initial drafts of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy document, the Presidency and the Counterterrorism Coordinator 
recommended streamlining the document, making it more concise and “leaving the focus 
on the most important and relevant measures.”191 This was later rebuffed by the Coreper 
whereby there was “substantial support” to retain the comprehensive, but long version of 
the action plan.192 Thus, the challenges of tracking such a large document will remain.  
The complexities in maintaining and updating the action plan of EU 
counterterrorism activities have proven to be a challenge. The completeness of the plan 
and the ability to trace items between updates is essential to ensure that progress is made 
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over time. The comprehensive version of the action plan will likely continue, due to 
member support. The challenge of accurate tracking will also continue, due to EU 
manpower limitations and bilateral relationships. The way forward rests upon locking 
down the action plan and its objectives and emphasizing the need that Member States 
provide adequate status information.  
D. SUMMARY 
Following each of the terrorist attacks in the United States, Madrid, and London, 
there have been surges in activity by the EU, which increased the scope and depth of 
counterterrorism efforts. Statements in the form of framework decisions or declarations 
were made after each attack, not only condemning the attacks but also reaffirming the 
EU’s resolve to fight terrorism collectively. In addition, group cohesion was reinforced 
further after the Madrid attacks by agreeing to a Solidarity Clause for mutual support 
should one member be attacked. The EU created a position to coordinate and monitor 
counterterrorism activity, although with limited power to do so. Finally, as the capstone 
document, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy combines all these efforts into one 
coordinated picture to solidify the EU approach for the long term. All these acts represent 
an incremental but undeniable trend of increasing cooperation and coordination in 
fighting terrorism.  
The EU efforts to monitor implementation of counterterrorism actions are as 
complex as the action plans. Individual and collective threat perceptions influence the 
perceived need for national legislation, as well as the willingness to implement actions 
without brewing conflict within their own minorities. Bureaucratic cooperation also 
varies between countries and takes time to arrange. Member States are also conscious of 
public opinion, which often ranks social issues higher than terrorism, for resources to 
implement. Finally, there are administrative difficulties in tracking such a sizable action 
plan with limited resources and power, and in the face of constantly changing objectives. 
Some difficulties will further be resolved by sticking to the baseline objectives laid out in 
the new Counter-Terrorism Strategy. However, some difficulties will remain, as EU 
Member States continue to come up against required tradeoffs for national priorities due 
to resource limitations and public preferences. Assuming no new attacks and no 
constraints to counterterrorism effort, the future for action item implementation must rely 
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on time to allow the required processing within national bureaucracies, to apply subtle 
but recurring reminders in the six-monthly updates, and to engrain the new standards or 
levels of agreed cooperation. Although issues with implementation and enforcement 
persist, the forward progress achieved by the EU in the four years following 9/11 
represents a commendable effort. Seeing how each increment is taken in direct response 
to a terrorist attack reinforces the observation of the reactive nature of EU 
counterterrorism efforts.193  
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III. THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTER-TERRORISM 
STRATEGY—ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to assess any aspect of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy,194 it is 
essential to look at, and become familiar with, the actual text of the document. The stated 
goal of the Strategy and the targeted threat should vector the EU’s intentions. The ways 
in which the EU plans to address this threat and achieve its goal will frame the EU’s 
approach, as will the means through which the EU can create a set of cooperative tools. 
Familiarization with the vector, language, specificity, and scope of the Strategy as agreed 
to by all twenty-five Member States will provide the fundamental baseline from which 
further analysis, comparisons, and conclusions will take shape. This chapter will review 
the intent or goal of the Strategy, the threat perception upon which the Strategy is based, 
and ways in which the EU plans to enact this approach. It will then review the primary 
responsibility for enacting the Strategy, actions given priority, and the EU outline for 
assuring that all counterterrorism efforts are subjected to democratic oversight. The 
document should provide a consolidated approach for EU counterterrorism. 
B. INTENT 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy states at the very beginning its strategic 
commitment: “To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make 
Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice.”195 
Four aspects of this statement stand out: 
1. The statement begins with the goal of the Strategy, “to combat terrorism.” 
However, the goal of combating terrorism lacks specificity. While the EU would 
obviously want to avoid future attacks on its citizens and property, this goal does not state 
but merely infers this real desire. The stated goal is lacking a specified desired result. It 
could be presumed that the most desirable result of the EU’s efforts would be to eliminate 
terrorist attacks. Since to completely eliminate the threat is highly unrealistic, as the EU 
                                                 
194 Council, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 14469/4/05 REV 4. 
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states later in the Strategy,196 the goal might then be to reduce or minimize terrorist 
attacks. However, that is not the goal; the goal is merely to combat terrorism. From the 
outset though, this use of an action verb and the concise wording show an attempt by the 
EU to succinctly state its intended purpose for the Strategy. 
2. The strategic commitment then states that this goal must be accomplished 
“globally.” This qualifier has two perspectives, which have been included in previous EU 
counterterrorism documents. First, to “combat terrorism globally” leaves no mistake 
about where the EU sees its realm of action. The EU intends to act wherever necessary, 
not just among its membership or within its own national boundaries. This aspect is 
reflective of the ESS statements of the EU as a global actor.197 Second, this also infers a 
requisite degree of cooperation with other nations throughout the globe and with 
international organizations. The reiterative notion throughout all the EU declarations is 
that the fight against terrorism must be global,198 calling on the UN and other countries 
and regional groups of countries as necessary partners. The combined understanding of 
the word “globally” creates the two-way synergy of fighting terrorism both with the EU 
pushing beyond its borders and pulling in cooperation from other institutional and 
national partners. The inclusion of the global dimension of the fight against terrorism is 
reinforced in this strategic commitment statement. 
3. The straightforward reference to the importance of human rights immediately 
follows the stated goal. The first draft of the Strategy did not include this clause on 
human rights.199 The second draft included it, but it was at the end of the statement.200 
The third draft saw its movement from the end of the strategic commitment to near the 
beginning, where it stayed through the final version of the document.201 Thus, the  
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addition, movement, and final placement of the clause on human rights indicate an 
overarching preference for ensuring that human rights concerns are paramount in how the 
EU fights terrorism and for wanting that preference to be specifically identified. 
The TEU, which founded the EU and its basic structure as it exists today, 
incorporates elements assuring protection of human rights. Listed among the founding 
principles of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the main precursor to the TEU, and expanded 
in the TEU enacted in 1993, is the premise that the protection of human rights is both 
integral to the principles of the Union and is to be reflected in external policies.202 Since 
the protection of human rights was already a fundamental principle of the EU, it would, 
of course, be incorporated into any EU counterterrorism activities.  
From a different perspective, this principle is so fundamental to the institution 
itself that it would seem unnecessary to reiterate it in individual EU strategies. In the end, 
the likely impetus of this inclusion would have been the continual struggle within 
national and supranational structures to balance counterterrorism measures with 
preservation of civil liberties and human rights.203 The establishment of the EU as a 
multilateral institution makes it no more immune to the pitfalls of balancing security 
concerns with civil liberties than any nation-state. While the EU may defer responsibility 
to the Member States for implementation of counterterrorism measures and thus the 
protection of human rights while enacting those measures, it cannot disavow its 
responsibility to uphold basic human rights within its own structures.204  
The concern over human rights endures because there is no perfect or automatic 
balance that fits all cases and all preferences over time. In the mid-1990s, civil rights 
groups within the EU voiced concerns over data collection and protection measures used 
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by EU institutions such as Europol.205 These concerns continued in 2000 with debates 
about the compatibility of counterterrorism laws and human rights.206 After the attacks 
on 9/11, “in some countries, debates [had] sharpened over the balance between security 
and civil liberties.”207 There was commentary that the emergence of stronger police and 
judicial cooperation was overshadowing individual rights, such that “from the 
individual’s point of view, there seems more emphasis on security than freedom.”208 As 
an observation of U.S. counterterrorism measures taken after 9/11, some European 
Scholars argue “that the fast adoption of a wide range of measures may have been at the 
expense of a cautious consideration of human rights, privacy and effects on the free 
movement of persons.”209 All these examples demonstrate how sensitive European elites 
are concerning the compatibility of counterterrorism measures with human rights 
protection.  
4. The last aspect of this strategic commitment is the confinement of the area of 
concern to the homeland, Europe; and the people to protect, Europeans. Specifically, the 
purpose is to “make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice.”210 There is no larger statement of purpose that would extend the 
benefits of fighting or reducing terrorism to other regions or to enlarge the region of 
protection beyond European interests. As a regional organization, the EU focuses on 
Europe, but this limited range diminishes the notion of the EU as a global actor. Since the 
EU is a multinational institution, of the geographical size and economical impact of other 
nations that are powerful enough to act globally, it perceives its role as more 
overarching.211 However, here the EU portrays the collective nation-state vice global 
actor by desiring protection within its regional boundaries. Thus, the strategic 
commitment as laid down in the first sentence of the Strategy indicates both a limitless 
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and a limited scope on different levels. It calls for a global scope of action focused upon a 
very broad goal of combating terrorism; yet, the area to be affected is quite limited: the 
EU homeland.  
C. THREAT PERCEPTION 
Since the title of the document itself states that this is a strategy to counter 
terrorism, and following the stated goal to combat terrorism, it should be a foremost 
requirement to define what exactly the EU considers terrorism, how and why it threatens 
the EU, and why it is necessary and important to fight this threat. However, the document 
is very brief in discussing the threat of terrorism. The Strategy states:  
Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious 
threat to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the 
rights and freedoms of our citizens, especially through the indiscriminate 
targeting of innocent people. Terrorism is criminal and unjustifiable under 
any circumstances.212  
After the first cursory statement that terrorism is a “serious threat,” later in the 
document it claims more ominously that it is “the main threat.”213 However, the Strategy 
does not define what terrorism is, nor does it define who is a terrorist. Neither is there any 
reference to any EU (or other) source for such definition or notion for what this Strategy 
is targeting. By 2005, the EU already had an established definition of terrorism214 which 
it could have referenced. In the beginning of the document, the EU does briefly touch on 
the global environment and how terrorists exploit it to their ends, but this does not 
compensate for the overall lack of adequate threat assessment explicitly defining the need 
for the Strategy.215 This lack of adequate definition makes the document must less 
persuasive as a stand-alone strategy.  
Traditionally, Europe has followed the lead of the United States with respect to 
security. “Europeans’ positions are defined firstly in relation to American policy, and not 
with respect to a truly European threat assessment,”216 as Nicole Gnesotto critically 
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asserts. However, in the wake of the U.S. approach to combating terrorism—primarily 
unilateral, focusing on military means, and in 2003, increasingly pre-emptive per the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq—the transatlantic rift that has evolved following the end of the Cold War 
seemed to signal a new abyss in transatlantic alignment.217 While some governments 
were staunch supporters of the United States and its military campaigns, others were 
much less assured of the approach.218 European public opinion of the United States, its 
leadership, and its President decreased markedly from 2002 to 2004, and continued 
through 2006. Many Europeans no longer desired U.S. leadership in world affairs.219 As 
such, the traditional European positioning relative to the United States now took on a 
different meaning, whereby Europeans increasingly position themselves apart from the 
United States and its approach to terrorism. The EU treatment of the threat of terrorism is 
likewise in contrast with the U.S. description in its National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, with its extensive and overarching discussion of the threat.220 The strains in 
the Transatlantic Alliance would necessitate a much more autonomous framing of this 
EU security perspective.  
However, disagreeing with the U.S. approach and agreeing on a different concept 
is a substantial challenge for the EU. Despite the existence of predecessors like the 
terrorism definition or the ESS, there is no recollection of these documents or further 
elaboration in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The closest the Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy document comes to specifically referring to terrorists and WMD is in the last of 
the four pillars for EU action, buried among twenty-six key priorities listed throughout 
the Strategy.221 Even then, it references only the need to work with partners and provide 
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technical assistance to other countries to stop terrorists from acquiring WMD.222 The 
reduction of the “greatest threat” 223 mentioned in an overarching security document to a 
“key priority” among dozens in the subordinate security document creates inconsistency 
between these two presumably aligned strategies.  
The EU has yet to produce a single definitive terrorism threat assessment to 
specifically determine who and to what extent terrorism threaten the EU and its Member 
States.224 In 2001, the EU approved and began producing an unclassified report 
consolidating all unclassified information regarding terrorist attacks and trend 
information, as provided by the Member States and analyzed by Europol. The report was 
intended for the European Parliament but was forwarded to the Council as well.225 This, 
too, could have added to at least the modicum of threat perception identified in the 
Strategy document. However, given that this report is unclassified, it likely did not 
include details and inferences that would be made within a national or integrated 
intelligence organization. As such, the degree of threat perception released for public 
consumption could be significantly different from any internal threat assessment. 
Attempts to come up with a credible threat assessment have run into the same 
problem. An EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)226 paper attempted “to fill the gap” 
in EU threat assessment.227 Since it is available in the public domain, it includes only 
publicly available information. Other ISS papers have also addressed terrorism and its 
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effect on Europe, and they have provided constructive criticism for EU actions against 
terrorism; but again, since they are in the public domain, they cannot compensate for an 
internal threat assessment. One Chaillot Paper published in October 2005 supported this 
claim by referencing the stated desire for increased information-sharing of intelligence 
assessments. The report recognized, though, that this is not likely because of inhibitions 
for sharing raw intelligence gathered by sensitive methods and sources.228 Intelligence is 
among “the least publicized, yet most effective, parts of the counterterrorist efforts.”229 
The light handling of such a fundamental element by the EU leaves the basis for the 
Strategy to counter such a threat on a weak footing.  
D. FOUR COUNTERTERRORISM PILLARS 
The EU builds its Strategy to combat terrorism upon four pillars: prevent, protect, 
pursue, and respond.230 One Polish newspaper noted the UK influence on the Strategy, 
since the UK held the Presidency during its development.231 The four EU pillars are 
highly reflective of the counterterrorism strategy of the United Kingdom, which outlines 
“four linked campaigns (the four P’s): prevention, pursuit, protection, and 
preparation.”232 The prevalence of terrorism in the United Kingdom, both as a haven and 
recruitment base, makes the United Kingdom possibly the most affected of all the EU 
members.233 Given the UK’s history of urging the EU to do more to fight terrorism, it 
was thought that the United Kingdom could lead the Council to “a meeting of minds at 
the European level on strategy.”234 The resulting EU pillars indicate an obvious nod to 
the UK strategy, but are tailored for the EU level and degree of implementation capacity. 
Each pillar will now be discussed individually. 
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1. To prevent people from turning to terrorism. This pillar draws from several of 
the previous versions of EU objectives to combat terrorism. It incorporates the March 
2004 objectives “to deepen the international consensus and enhance efforts to combat 
terrorism,” “to address factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into 
terrorism,” and “to target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third 
Countries where counterterrorist capability or commitment to combating terrorism needs 
to be enhanced.”235 Specifically, the Strategy names promoting good governance, 
dissuading radicalization, and developing multicultural dialogue.236 This complements 
the ESS objective on building security. The EU believes by tackling the root causes, 
radicalization and recruitment into terrorism can be fended off.237 Al Qaeda is 
specifically mentioned, since “this type of terrorism currently represents the main threat 
to the Union as a whole.”238 According to the Strategy, this is mainly a challenge for (1) 
public diplomacy to limit the rhetoric that there is a “clash of civilizations” and to help 
change the perception of national and European policies; (2) community, travel, and 
internet monitoring to prevent incitement and access to terrorist training; and (3) 
promoting “good governance, human rights, and democracy as well as education and 
economic prosperity” both within and outside the EU.239 This pillar also reflects on 
European challenges to successfully integrate the immigrant minority communities. 
Although it is acknowledged that people turn to terrorism all over the world, and thus 
there is need for global cooperation and assistance, the majority of this effort is geared 
towards prevention within the EU.240  
2. To protect citizens and infrastructure. This pillar is geared towards reducing 
vulnerability of key targets, including physical and electronic infrastructure, transport and 
soft targets (people) alike, as well as securing borders and reducing the impact of an 
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attack.241 It solidifies previous objectives for “strengthening air security,”242 and “to 
protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border 
control.”243 It moves beyond these to include the whole of critical infrastructure 
protection.244 This pillar is perhaps the most quantifiable of all EU pillars in actual 
implementation because physical security measures engage tangible targets, such as 
borders and transport systems. However, these systems are also very large and complex 
and cannot be completely locked down or secured. Coordinating efforts to protect these 
systems also become reliant upon the imprecise art of intelligence. Real-time intelligence, 
and sharing of that information, is necessary to complement physical security measures. 
Collecting and disseminating actionable intelligence can become challenging and 
difficult to implement, especially in democratic societies where civil liberties are 
paramount.245  
3. To disrupt terrorist activity and pursue terrorists across borders. This pillar 
incorporates multiple previous objectives: “enhancing police and judicial cooperation,” 
“developing international legal instruments,” “putting an end to the funding of 
terrorism”;246 “to maximize the capacity within EU bodies and Member States to detect, 
investigate, and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorism attacks,” “to deepen the 
international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism,” and “to 
reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources.”247 Since terrorists do 
not operate within national constraints, actions to disrupt and pursue terrorists require 
coordination throughout the Union.248 This pillar lists actual objectives: “to impede 
terrorists’ planning, disrupt their networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut 
off terrorists’ funding and access to attack materials, and bring them to justice, while 
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continuing to respect human rights and international law.” 249 These objectives do not 
relay any new direction for EU action. This pillar does, however, emphasize the 
collective nature of these efforts—“Member States will also focus on the security of the 
Union as a whole.”250 This requirement highlights the shared responsibility of all 
Member States for the collective security of the Union—a kind of peer pressure to 
implement national policies and actions for the good of all. 
This pillar also recognizes that a threat to Europe can come from outside the EU. 
Thus, it emphasizes not only the EU role, but also the “global dimension,” for which it 
references international law through UN antiterrorism conventions and assistance to 
priority nations to make the fight more globally inclusive and complete.251 In this way, 
the Strategy shifts to a more international concept of a “secure world” because of the 
inference to the EU as more of a global actor.252  
4. To manage and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. This pillar also 
recalls a previously enacted objective from March 2004, when the EU agreed in the 
Solidarity Clause to assist one another in the event of an attack and “to enhance the 
capability of the European Union and of Member States to deal with the consequences of 
a terrorist attack.”253 How the EU and its Member States respond to an attack is 
fundamental, since, as the Strategy admits, “we cannot reduce the risk of terrorist attacks 
to zero” and “attacks can have effects across EU borders.”254 The EU’s shared database 
for resources and assets will facilitate not only European mutual assistance, but will also 
be useful to assist other priority third countries and international organizations, including 
the UN, in consequence management. These resources serve as the back-up plan if the 
Member State’s response mechanisms prove insufficient. This also reinforces the EU’s 
role as a facilitator and not a principal agent.  
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E. MEMBER STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
As a Union and not a sovereign state, the EU Strategy notes that the Member 
States are primarily responsible for meeting the challenges addressed in each pillar.255 
This responsibility has been reiterated time and again by EU officials and especially by 
the Counterterrorism Coordinator. However, the EU also asserts its voice in these four 
pillars (and Member State action) by highlighting the crosscutting roles through which 
the EU as a Union can add value to the actions taken by the Member States. These 
crosscutting roles are: “strengthening national capabilities, facilitating European 
cooperation, developing collective capability, and promoting international 
partnership.”256 Most of these involve sharing knowledge to cross-breed best practices 
and draw the Member States closer together through use of EU bodies, such as Europol, 
Eurojust,257 Frontex,258 the Monitoring and Information Centre,259 and the Joint 
Situation Centre.260 This increasing unity may also (perhaps informally) create more 
uniformity across national practices, making future EU action and policy more cohesive 
and efficient.261 Finally, the EU is well-formed to interact with other international 
organizations such as the UN, and also to work through the UN and with third countries 
in a coordinated manner to deepen international consensus. The EU may work with larger 
third countries, such as the United States, since, as a corporate actor, it can negotiate  
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more as an equal partner. The EU may also work with smaller third countries to which it 
may provide substantial aid and assistance. It will, however, take more cohesion to be 
fully credible on the global stage as a fully capable Union.262  
The one aspect of responsibility that is, perhaps, implied but not stated is that of 
measuring effectiveness. Through all the declarations and action plans to combat 
terrorism, many references are made to monitoring progress and tracking implementation 
by Member States. However, no mention is made of measuring effectiveness. If a 
strategy seeks to address a threat, then the strategy should be effective to achieve the 
intended result. The fact that the goal of this Strategy is “to combat terrorism,” may be 
naively interpreted to mean that the EU wishes only to engage in the fight, and therefore, 
merely agreeing to and implementing measures would suffice. However, this is assuredly 
not the desired effect. Likewise, the concept of responsibility seems to make the 
assumption that measures against terrorism are automatically effective in impeding or 
reducing terrorism. After five years, at least some counterterrorism activities could be 
measurable to some extent. Yet, this obvious necessity is not included in the EU Strategy, 
indeed in the entirety of the EU approach to fighting terrorism. 
On the whole, the EU verbiage is deliberate but also nonspecific. The EU is a 
large organization with an extensive area of concern and limited power at the 
supranational level to act.263 This limited power and acknowledgement that terrorism and 
its risks cannot be completely eliminated264 indicates an unfavorable starting position for 
the EU. The Strategy expresses the desire to “constitute a comprehensive and 
proportionate response to the international terrorist threat,”265 but relies upon its Member 
States to enact this response. The EU is mainly in an overall coordinating role in framing 
collective actions and its focus is with its own affairs. Overall, the EU Strategy does not 
make elaborate promises that the EU itself cannot fulfill; it remains rather modest, that is 
realistic in this respect.  
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F. KEY PRIORITIES 
The EU Strategy does not list goals and objectives; instead it lists “key priorities” 
after the discussion of each pillar,266 twenty-six in total. These are actions already taken 
and ongoing, but nothing new. This is the same issue that the Council faced in creating 
other Common Strategies on Russia (June 1999), Ukraine (December 1999), and the 
Mediterranean (June 2000), following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, whereby the 
statements consisted of “broad objectives, merely restating what the EU is already 
doing.”267 The EU began laying out actions for fighting terrorism after the September 11 
attacks and implemented semiannual action plans and status reviews after the March 11, 
2004, attacks in Madrid. It also had recently adopted strategies to address individual 
aspects of fighting terrorism, such as the strategies for countering radicalization and 
recruitment and for terrorist financing, mentioned above. The first draft of the Strategy 
did not include these key priorities, but instead called for a more concise action plan as an 
addendum to the Strategy.268 This was quickly reversed since there was “substantial 
support for maintaining the current longer and comprehensive Action Plan.” Adding key 
priorities into the Strategy thus provided a way to impart greater importance upon 
specific counterterrorism actions.  
While these key priorities do describe what needs to be done in response to 
various aspects of fighting terrorism, they are not more than as a snapshot in time. This 
approach could severely limit the ability of the Strategy to function as a document of 
principle, because it could be out of date or partially irrelevant in the coming months or 
years. The “key priorities” listed for each pillar do not convey any strategic action that 
was not already in progress, nor are they listed in a manner that identifies them as key 
functional areas or effects to be gained. They are listed more by their individual program  
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name or the action taken. This treatment does draw some attention to these particular 
actions in that they are listed in the actual Strategy apart from the masses listed only in 
the action plan, but the emphasis is marginal. 
G. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
The document includes a closing section on democratic accountability. This 
section holds that the Strategy, like the action plans, will be reviewed every six months 
“to consider progress together and promote transparency and balance in the EU’s 
approach.”269 The inclusion of the democratic accountability section underwent a 
transformation between the different revisions of the Strategy document. In the initial 
proposal, it was specifically laid out that various EU institutions would provide oversight 
for enactment of the Strategy and counterterrorism activities.270 However, towards the 
latter revisions, the specificity was reduced and broad overarching statements were added 
to describe how oversight was to be conducted, to include a High Level Political 
Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism, which allows both the European Commission and the 
European Parliament to provide input and feedback on counterterrorism efforts.271 This 
inclusive dialogue is reflective of the significant coordination through which EU 
counterterrorism measures have undergone since the 2004 Madrid attacks.272  
The EU is an evolving multilateral institution with little actual authority to force 
its Member States to enact its will. Nonetheless, since “all aspects of anti-terrorism policy 
and operations should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and, hence, 
democratically accountable,”273 this may be the reason why this section was included. 
This accountability can also bring to light human rights problem areas.274 While the 
oversight function neither limits nor enhances EU counterterrorism efforts, it does mirror 
accountability in national governments. The European Council is adopting a system of 
checks and balances to monitor its collective performance in enacting the Strategy. This 
would heighten visibility and transparency among the Member States and the European 
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population, to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of its efforts, and thus the 
security of Europe. The democratic accountability function in this Strategy both serves to 
strengthen public confidence by adopting oversight functions at the EU level and 
facilitates more visibility to ensure that the EU is accountable for its agreed actions.  
H. SUMMARY 
The EU Strategy is both specific and generic. It specifies actions taken and in 
progress and features some higher priorities from among the numerous items from the 
action plans. It also highlights the EU’s commitment to protecting human rights in the 
fight against terrorism. For the first time, it outlines a democratic oversight mechanism 
for accountability, serving to protect the democratic values inherent in the Union. Within 
the limited powers of the EU, in this regard, the Strategy is also specific about the 
responsibility of implementation falling to the Member States. In contrast, the Strategy 
comes across as generic in some critical aspects. First and foremost, the goal is not to 
eliminate, avoid, or even reduce terrorism, it is merely to fight it, with perhaps the 
assumption that the true desired end state will come to fruition. The Strategy is also 
generic in the definition and assessment of the threat to which the EU is responding. The 
goal and the threat are elements that must be most concrete in order to apply appropriate 
measures to affect the desired end state; these are both lacking in this document. This 
Strategy is a lofty, if measured, endeavor for an institution with still limited powers in 
security and defense.  
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IV. STRATEGIC POTENTIAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism has been around for centuries and will continue into the foreseeable 
future. With the vast accumulation of experience, there is a body of knowledge within the 
Western world that has taken account of the most effective approaches to fighting 
terrorism. Experts and scholars continue to relay these lessons. However, national 
preferences will always trump lessons learned, if it is perceived that gains can be realized 
in doing so. The EU, with its vast experience with terrorism among its Member States, 
has attempted to enact a Counter-Terrorism Strategy that is both purposeful and useful. In 
seeking to adopt a strategy to deal with the foremost threat facing European security, it 
encounters some limitations based in its own structure. The EU Strategy will now be 
evaluated according to general principles advocated by experts and scholars. The analysis 
of the Strategy will focus on: goal, threat, intelligence, decision-making and control 
mechanisms, and execution methods. The analysis also considers the overriding 
principles of safeguarding democratic values, ensuring public support and political will, 
and multilateral support and participation. The consideration and inclusion of all these 
criteria will allow an evaluation of the likely prospects for the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy to counter terrorism.  
B. THEORY—STRATEGY, GRAND STRATEGY, AND POLICY 
The concept of strategy has different levels from which it can affect change and 
be gauged. According to Martha Crenshaw, the overall “policy” is the political goal to be 
attained; it is that from which the strategies flow. Strategies in general are lower level 
approaches to achieve an overall policy goal. Policy is affected by “grand strategies,” 
which are “complex, multifaceted, and directed toward a distant time horizon. It 
establishes a framework that coordinates the objectives of individual strategies.”275 
Grand strategy involves all resources that can be brought to bear to affect the desired 
outcome. “[A grand strategy] determines what the State’s vital security interests are, 
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identifies critical threats to them, and specifies the means of dealing with them.”276 
Grand strategies are further divided into specific strategies that deal with individual 
aspects of the grand strategy. “A strategy requires a precisely specified political 
objective,” and outlines the ways (actions) and means (resources) that will sufficiently 
produce the desired ends (goal).277 Although traditionally considered with regard to 
military operations, any strategy should provide this level of specificity, applicability, and 
feasibility.  
The EU structure reflects awareness of these levels of policy and strategy, 
although not always in full measure. In the case of the EU, policy can be equated to the 
notion of the CFSP that endeavors to attain the “area of freedom, security, and justice,” as 
laid out in the TEU.278 The ESS could suffice for the concept of a grand strategy, having 
laid out the top five threats to European security and discussed overall objectives to 
address these threats.279 The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy would thus be assumed to 
fill in as a specific strategy under the ESS grand strategy. These assignments fit quite 
nicely in the grand scheme. However, EU endeavors do not completely fill in the full 
measure of each level. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’s “specified political 
objective,” the desired ends—“to combat terrorism”280—is not indicative of a measurable 
end state. The approach does outline the ways to combat terrorism, or affect a reduction 
in terrorism, via the common tools that it seeks to develop and use in its fight. However, 
the means to affect the implementation of these tools are not within the power of the EU 
to directly control, and implementation by the Member States is inconsistent.  
“Common strategies,” says Karen E. Smith, “must add value to what the EU is 
doing already, and should clearly set priorities.”281 The value added from the Counter-
Terrorism Strategy could lie in the strategic commitment to focus efforts, or in the mere 
publishing of a document to which everyone can understand and reference for future 
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efforts. However, as stated earlier, the Strategy does not necessarily outline anything new 
that was not already in progress when approved. Even the Strategy’s twenty-six “key 
priorities” reflect short-term activities, but no long-term objectives to be attained. The 
value must lie in the establishment of another baseline document, further cementing EU 
integration in matters of security and its role in combating terrorism. However, the 
“cemented” EU role is merely as facilitator. Implementation problems continue due to the 
influence of, and variation in, the preferences of the Member States, forcing only 
individual national priorities due to resources limitations.282  
Only five years after 9/11, and after two major attacks on EU soil, the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy is the first attempt to solidify a collective approach to 
terrorism. Despite a concerted effort to get all the EU members on the same page, the 
expectations can be only so high for such a complex entity. The attempt to entrench 
collective counterterrorism concepts in a strategy document falls short of a complete 
strategy. The stated goal does not reflect the actual desired measurable ends to be 
achieved. For the long haul, it remains to be seen if the process continues and builds a 
robust and useful toolkit of ways to engage the threat. Moreover, implementation will 
continue to be subject to availability and diligent application of Member State means or 
resources to support full use of the EU tools. Philip Heymann observes, “Experience to 
date reveals how far short of best practice the international community is in taking a 
strategic approach to countering international terrorism.”283  
C. UPHOLDING ESPOUSED PRINCIPLES 
Any effort taken by an organized society, be it a state or an institution, needs to 
adhere to its own espoused principles, so that the society and values themselves are not 
destroyed in the very attempt to protect them from terrorists.284 The EU Strategy should 
thus be consistent with the EU’s fundamental democratic principles and not undermine 
them. According to the third pillar of the TEU (JHA) and according to the concept of 
“Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” any EU Strategy should be limited and well-
defined—“not beyond what is demanded by the exigencies of the situation and directed 
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only against the terrorists themselves.”285 The EU seeks to do this by defining exactly 
what offenses are considered terrorist acts and by outlining what penalties shall be 
enacted for such acts across all EU Member States.286 The hard part is in unearthing 
these acts before they cause death and destruction, without going beyond what is needed 
to preclude the actual attack. Impinging on civil liberties has been a constant concern for 
Europeans as they move deeper and deeper into counterterrorism cooperation. It is hard 
to determine limits in fighting terrorism, and many European nations have diverging 
views of where the line should be drawn.287 When a major attack is successful, the 
immediate response is to do more than before, in the hope that the next attempt will be 
unsuccessful. The EU seems to have reached a level of action that includes a full 
complement of measures. Implementation is still not complete, nor will it be for some 
time. In fact, some measures are not estimated to be enacted until 2008.288 Since the EU 
believes that terrorism will always exist,289 concern over a “strategy that respects law and 
is concerned for life, liberty, and unity,”290 will continue to be subject to debate for their 
conformance to liberal democratic principles.  
The concern for human rights protection over counterterrorism measures is 
ongoing.291 The fact that the EU has increased measures to fight terrorism after each 
major attack presumes that its application of counterterrorism measures has been 
appropriate. Despite the vast experiences many EU countries have with fighting 
terrorism,292 their particular circumstances and corresponding approaches have been 
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quite distinct.293 The six countries that had counterterrorism legislation on the books 
before 9/11294 have already had to deal with the challenge of balancing security and 
liberty. EU-wide counterterrorism activities require reconciliation with both norms that 
have developed through national experiences with terrorism and the lack of any norms in 
countries that had never had to deal with terrorism or counterterrorism measures. The 
quick reactions to terrorism, exemplified by the United States and in the EU surges 
following attacks in Europe, demonstrate why oversight is essential.295 The “need for 
constant supervision and oversight”296 is no different from the national level. The EU has 
made provisions for this oversight in the Counter-Terrorism Strategy.297 The exercise of 
oversight over time should increase transparency, to provide reassurance to the public 
that democratic values are being upheld or to correct EU missteps as they occur.  
D. GOAL 
The goal of a strategy should provide a “precisely specified political 
objective,”298 per Martha Crenshaw. Again, the EU goal, “to combat terrorism,” is not 
measurable and is vaguely worded. The likely preferred outcome is that terrorism is 
reduced. The EU Strategy does state the goal succinctly; but the goal is obtuse and does 
not relay what is to be achieved. The ability to measure a desired outcome is also 
dependent upon the ability to clearly identify the need for strategy. The appropriate and 
detailed description of a goal to counter a threat requires a similarly detailed description 
and analysis of the threat. This matter of description shall be the next point of discussion. 
This vague goal confirms, Omand’s pereption that “there is not yet sufficient common 
international understanding at the European or transatlantic level of what we are really 
fighting and what strategy we are following.”299 
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E. THREAT 
The threat assessment is the backbone of security strategy because it details the 
causes of the threat and potential impacts. David Veness affirms, “A critical success 
factor in the development of counterterrorism has been the recognition of the problem 
and an understanding of its implications.”300 Furthermore, Philip Heymann adds “that the 
threat of terrorism cannot be completely eliminated.”301 The EU recognizes this fact in 
the Strategy, although it does not state so until discussion of the fourth pillar. This 
acknowledgement, in keeping with its “light treatment” of the terrorist threat, is not 
mentioned in the beginning of the Strategy but is buried in the document. Despite 
recognition that terrorism cannot be eliminated, it is imperative to define the threat. Many 
European nations are very familiar with terrorism, and some are only now learning, each 
having its own conception of terrorism and how it threatens that nation. The collective 
agreement of what constitutes terrorist acts was a solid first step in defining the threat.302  
The repeated collective statements that terrorism is a threat and that the EU 
should fight it collectively, also in some way reaffirm the threat and internalize both the 
collective threat and collective counteraction. Inclusion and prominence of terrorism in 
the first-ever EU Security Strategy also reinforce its existence and priority. However, this 
threat is not quantifiable because there is no actual assessment that synthesizes detailed 
intelligence information into one product, into one EU assessment of the threat. 
Moreover, “a successful European counterterrorism strategy is one that thinks and plans 
ahead, addressing the threats likely to be posed by the next generation of terrorists.”303 
Given that there is no threat assessment at all precludes the opportunity to plan for 
potential future threats, because they have not been postulated. The absence of any real 
terrorism threat assessment may not impede current EU efforts given the recent terrorist 
attacks in Europe. These attacks provide a short-term substitution for a threat assessment, 
offering proof of the terrorist threat. However, as time passes and assuming no new 
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terrorist attacks, the threat may grow hollow. It remains to be seen how the European 
populations and how EU Member States’ leadership continue down the path to further 
integration for more effective counterterrorism cooperation with no ongoing impetus to 
require such extensive actions.  
F. CATASTROPHIC THREATS 
The threat of catastrophic terrorism is not a new phenomenon,304 but is a newly 
advertised phenomenon. The nexus between terrorism and WMD (chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons [CBRN]) compose the direst threat to EU societies.305 
Since the early 1990s, “fears of [CBRN] terrorism have been in the minds of government 
and experts, but have remained unknown to the wider public.”306 The horrific events of 
9/11 have prompted experts to foretell the combination of terrorism for mass casualty 
effect with chemical and biological weapons.307 This disastrous possibility necessitates a 
high priority of intelligence gathering on CBRN.308 EU efforts on this issue are likely not 
for public dissemination. However, the minute inclusion of WMD in the Strategy seems 
oddly out of proportion with the priority received in the ESS and by expert opinions. The 
EU may deal with this threat through existing nonproliferation measures, and within EU 
Member States. Again, if such is the case, it is not referenced in the Strategy to provide 
assurances of “comprehensive and rigorous counter-proliferation measures.”309 
G. POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 
Political will is crucial to success in fighting terrorism.310 The EU is still an 
evolving institution, a unique polity of pooled sovereignty. While agreement on actions to 
combat terrorism has proven swift following terrorist attacks,311 actual national 
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implementation has been slow.312 The transposition of EU measures into national 
legislation takes time.313 As Charles Kupchan remarks:  
Even under the best of circumstances, processes of integration and 
amalgamation are slow and difficult; after all, the states coming together 
to form a new polity are being asked to give up what they cherish most—
their sovereignty and autonomy.314  
A good deal of the sovereignty transferred by Member States is subject to public 
opinion and national priorities. If the public does not see value in counterterrorism efforts 
or perceives other issues as being of higher priority, national governments will not be 
inclined to enact EU measures against national public opinion and support.  
“Political will is important,” notes Omand, “in both the long and the short term. If 
it is to be effective, it needs to be sustained.”315 Providing the public good information is 
essential to this end.316 The population needs to believe that counterterrorism actions are 
“both necessary and effective.”317 European constituencies tend to believe fighting 
terrorism is important but not as important as social issues.318 They, likewise, believe that 
counterterrorism policy should be made at the EU level, although only about half are 
satisfied with EU counterterrorism efforts.319 Despite this preference of EU action 
against terrorism, national implementation will always lag in priority to more immediate 
concerns affecting “social” security and quality of life.320 The reactive nature of the EU 
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in responding to terrorist attacks321 also calls into question any ability for a consistent 
level of public support. “Surges of actions whose costs often exceed their benefits” are 
not only questionable in their ability to be effective against terrorism,322 but also impress 
only short-term priorities on the general populace. The management of public 
expectations, highlighted as an objective for the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, is 
important for this purpose.323 The shifting level of attention terrorism has received in 
reaction to terrorist attacks cannot be entirely eliminated, but a permanent EU effort, via a 
published and actively pursued strategy to “keep the public informed,”324 will perhaps 
create a more uniform and consistent perception of the EU approach to combating 
terrorism. “We are still at a relatively unsophisticated stage in our thinking,” says Omand, 
“of how to present internationally and domestically what will be a long campaign.”325 
However, this message will aspire to create a sustained level of public support for 
counterterrorism efforts. 
Over time, the political will and public support for EU action have increased. “As 
it has done over the past five decades,” argues Kupchan, “Europe is then likely to muster 
the will to take its next step forward.”326. As the EU takes more assured steps in 
integration, demonstrating its collective political will, so too will EU political power 
strengthen. But this will not be a quick process—“the legitimation of a supranational 
realm of politics always lags considerably behind the evolution of supranational 
institutions, which itself is a laborious and incremental process.”327 What is most 
important to build this political will is to show the EU citizens and indeed the rest of the 
world that CFSP and its constituent strategies are “truly alive and ‘kicking’.”328 The 
necessary prerequisite is that Member States demonstrate the political will to follow up 
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on commitments they signed up to.329 When the continued activity and support within the 
organization is unwavering, conviction that EU efforts are sincere will further solidify. 
H. INTELLIGENCE 
Thorough and sound intelligence is deemed by some as the most important factor 
in combating terrorism.330 It is an obvious priority in any counterterrorism strategy.331 
The EU does include actions to share intelligence between Member States and EU 
agencies. However, this level of cooperation is far below what would be considered 
thorough. Since EU agencies, such as Europol, depend on intelligence from the Member 
States, and since “governments often share only ‘sanitized’ intelligence,”332 the real 
measure of requisite intelligence is never achieved at the institutional level. As is 
normally the case in information-sharing, this disparity is due to national protection of 
intelligence sources and methods.333 As stated earlier, this is a primary reason why there 
is no EU threat assessment.334 The intelligence needed to bring terrorists to justice seems 
to be evolving, but a counterterrorism strategy should also be led by intelligence335 to 
provide substance behind the actions being taken. Currently, this sharing must occur 
between Member States, since the EU has no individual and consolidated intelligence 
organization to collect and produce finished intelligence to support the counterterrorism 
measures taken at the EU level.  
I. CENTRALIZED CONTROL 
The cohesion provided by an integrated control mechanism in the fight against 
terrorism is crucial to a strategy’s success.336 The cohesion is hard to attain on the EU 
level. As Knud Erik Jørgensen explains: 
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Paradoxically, the institutional structure of the CSFP is at the same time 
very centralized and very decentralized. It is centralized in the sense that 
most policy-making is carried out within the Council, including its various 
agencies, and decentralized in the sense that Member State governments 
play a crucial role.337  
The EU’s counterterrorism efforts fall under the auspices of the High 
Representative for CFSP, and are subject to the same paradox. Within this second pillar, 
and also in the third pillar for JHA, decision-making takes place within a structure of 
“intergovernmental bargaining” between Member States to reach consensus 
agreements.338 Since the EU Member States “view greater cooperation in the law 
enforcement and judicial fields as a crucial step on the road to further European 
Integration,”339 their commitment to the overall fight against terrorism over the long term 
might be strengthened.340 This will also apply to the ESDP which is only seven years old 
and rapidly expanding.  
Initial aspirations for counterterrorism policy were in part limited by insufficient 
political consensus.341 Although many high priority and high visibility items have been 
enacted, others await agreement. The EU Evidence Warrant, a natural complement to the 
EU Arrest Warrant that has already been implemented and tested,342 has only recently 
found consensus.343 There is no mechanism to push through items, critical or not, with 
less than unanimous agreement, in a manner corresponding to the first pillar of the 
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European Communities.344 In most cases, the second and third pillars both still require 
unanimity to enact decisions. The terrorist attacks and the surges of counterterrorism 
actions have required greater cooperation in an attempt to contain the threat. Although 
“states are increasingly regarded as less able to exercise traditional sovereignty over high 
security issues such as terrorism and their capacity to manage may decline, their role in 
international coordination is still pivotal,”345 as they are still generally able to impart 
their will within the decision-making process. The degree of centralized control provided 
by the EU is one of only guidance, with the Member States still holding the authority to 
impede consensus and action.  
J. DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION AND COORDINATION 
Strategy must also determine responsible actors and measure progress to 
determine effectiveness.346 The EU Strategy decentralizes execution by allocating overall 
responsibility for implementing EU agreed measures to the Member States. Time and 
again this delegation is reiterated. However, without effective sanctions, it is by nature 
imperfect, even if the EU is tracking implementation. The inconsistent execution among 
Member States creates cracks in EU efforts for a united front against terrorism. The 
structure of decentralized execution has not assured actual implementation. Furthermore, 
coordination is ad hoc. Problems with Member States not coordinating with the 
Counterterrorism Coordinator’s office and the ongoing reliance on bilateral arrangements 
between Member States signal that coordination is not as sweeping or prevalent as 
implied by collective agreements.347 All the EU members follow their own national 
interests; thus, “the key challenge in counterterrorism lies in coordinating the contribution 
of people not on the [EU] payroll.”348 But coordination is crucial at a time when fighting  
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today’s terrorism requires intense international coordination of “hard counter-terrorist 
measures such as law enforcement and intelligence cooperation [to] contain the 
threat.”349  
The execution of counterterrorism measures among the Member States and the 
coordination of efforts have been less than thorough. Neither have these efforts been 
subject to evaluation at the EU level to determine if their implementation, however 
limited, has proven effective. Despite the fact that the data might not yet be available, 
there is no mention of beginning any evaluation of effectiveness thus far. EU action plans 
track only implementation and progress. The real test of decentralized execution and 
coordination is not only whether it is done or not, but also if it works. Perhaps, this is a 
future step for the EU to take; but for now, the measure of any contribution must be 
tempered with the knowledge that the effectiveness of actions taken has yet to be 
evaluated. 
K. MULTIFUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
The fight against terrorism requires an all-encompassing approach mobilizing 
resources across the spectrum of action. “To win the struggle against Al Qaeda you need 
to win the intelligence war and use law enforcement agencies worldwide as well as 
organize cooperation in the finance sector, civil aviation industry, private sector and 
between the public and private sectors,” Wilkinson argues, and it must “employ the 
education system, religious and community leaders, and the mass media in a battle of 
ideas.”350 “The strategy must be multi-pronged,” in other words go far beyond a military 
response.351 The EU is very well designed to deal with this array of tasks. It has learned 
the necessity of enacting a multifunctional approach to fighting terrorism. This is seen 
through the expansion of objectives and actions each time there was a surge in activity. 
The plan eventually grew to incorporate a full complement of measures, and not just 
include those that were most obvious or urgent following an attack. This full range of 
measures provides security “by protecting global networks, promot[ing] economic 
growth, protect[ing] the constitutional rights of our citizens, [and] promis[ing] credible 
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alternatives to the terrorist lie.”352 The need to include a cross-cultural dialogue to 
“engage with European Muslims”353 also speaks to the expanse of actions taken to 
combat terrorism. The EU has adopted a multifunctional array of counterterrorism 
measures to combat terrorism. 
L. MULTILATERAL APPROACH 
The EU has engaged in a multilateral approach to fight terrorism. As Wilkinson 
affirms, “The first prerequisite for an effective strategy must be that it is genuinely 
multinational.”354 The EU by definition is multinational. Beyond the EU framework, the 
strategy must engage Muslim nations, too.355 This is important for the cross-cultural 
dialogue that the EU and the Member States must engage in to give credence to European 
efforts to address their poor record of integration. Engaging both within their own 
communities and with other nations across cultures will at least enable greater 
understanding, avoid misperception, and prepare the ground for meaningful cooperation. 
The EU reiterates its intention to coordinate with other international organizations, such 
as the UN, to partner with other key nations, like the United States, and to assist third 
countries in fighting terrorism and its causes.356 These collaborative efforts show that the 
EU truly perceives this as a comprehensive multilateral cooperative effort. Collaboration 
with the international community will facilitate another “essential underpinning—
effective international liaison and agreement,”357 to enact like-minded initiatives to 
combat terrorism. The multilateral approach of the EU is promising, but with the EU 
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M. SUMMARY 
The cumulative lessons learned from past efforts to counter terrorism create a 
base of comparison for current EU efforts. This analysis shows how some aspects of EU 
counterterrorism follow recommended best practices and where it falls short. The 
Strategy contains both a direct statement for public consumption and to focus Member 
States, and provides the tools to take coordinated action. It also seeks to reinforce the 
democratic principles espoused by the EU. This Strategy benefits from the ongoing EU 
integration efforts and from a proven imminent threat to garner the political will to take 
collective action. The EU also benefits from its structure of decision-making in the field 
of counterterrorism, whereby all decisions are taken centrally by the EU Council. The 
multiple surges of EU reaction to terrorist attacks have also created a full complement of 
counterterrorism functions that are executed not by the EU, but by the members. Finally, 
the EU both benefits from and furthers its multilateral approach by expanding its 
counterterrorism efforts to allow international cooperation. These embedded elements of 
the EU effort contribute to the strategic potential of this Strategy.  
Yet, the EU Strategy also falls short in a number of counterterrorism best 
practices. The Strategy also has several missing elements which impedes success in 
fighting terrorism. The EU’s stated goal and assessment of threat are both severely 
lacking in the EU document, as is any discussion of the worst threat imaginable: that of 
terrorism using WMD. Furthermore, the EU has no consolidated intelligence source to 
address these and other intelligence needs. The EU’s power to affect many of the actions 
it approves is also severely lacking. Instead, reliance on Member States to implement 
actions, and in such a way as to protect civil liberties, often leaves gaps in combating 
terrorism. The missing pieces from the EU Strategy present compelling arguments 


























The release of the EU’s first published strategy to combat terrorism garnered no 
significant public analysis addressing the potential of this Strategy. Fighting terrorism is a 
key component of European security, as is the deepening of EU integration for the 
continued development of the European “area of freedom, security, and justice.”358 The 
combined impact of EU actions taken after the terrorist attacks in 2001, 2004, and 2005, 
contributed to the fight against terrorism and increased the range and depth of EU 
integration within the second (security) and third (justice and law enforcement) pillars. 
This thesis has reviewed the formation of these measures through the surges of activity in 
response to terrorist attacks. It has further identified the problems that have arisen. These 
gaps weaken the EU’s collective front against terrorism. Recognizing the EU learning 
process, through previous EU efforts, provides the origins of the Strategy as well as 
forecasts potential problems in fighting terrorism. In creating an EU Strategy, the main 
idea was to create a long-term plan for EU counterterrorism efforts and to convey this 
consolidated approach to the European population.359 The Strategy further solidifies EU 
integration in the field of counterterrorism, but when measured against counterterrorism 
lessons learned proves less persuasive in its ability to be effective as a strategy.  
B. ORIGINS OF THE STRATEGY 
Preceding EU counterterrorism actions forged the Strategy document. The TEU 
enabled the pursuit of a full range of counterterrorism action;360 and the ESS built the 
foundation by providing the first “strategy” document addressing the security threats to 
Europe, terrorism and WMD first among them.361 The EU Council asked that primary 
follow-up efforts from the ESS should include fighting terrorism.362 The creation of EU 
positions to specifically shepherd security and counterterrorism efforts, via the High 
Representative for the CFSP and the Counterterrorism Coordinator, also emphasized the 
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importance of these areas.363 The coincidence of the UK attacks and the UK Presidency 
of the EU in 2005 allowed considerable British influence on the structure and nature of 
the counterterrorism pillars.364 Given the extensive British experience fighting terrorism 
and the unique multicultural challenges within its own borders,365 this was perhaps not a 
bad lead to follow. It was, of course, tempered by the collective will of the Council, but 
still the main overarching ideas reappear in the four pillars. The ongoing public debate 
over the balance between counterterrorism efforts and civil liberties was also reflected in 
the Strategy, with the priority given to human rights protection.366 Finally, the action 
plans provided an existing pool of measures, from which to draw the “key priorities” for 
the EU’s long-term plan.367 Every element of the Strategy can be directly traced to a 
point of origin within the EU institution or its preceding counterterrorism actions. 
C. PROBLEM AREAS 
In working towards increased EU integration and more expansive 
counterterrorism efforts, the EU has encountered a number of challenges. The most 
important hurdle is the delay in reaching consensus on more controversial 
counterterrorism actions that may still need to be added to the EU’s approach, such as the 
EU Evidence Warrant which would align national standards of evidence across the 
Union.368 However, the most frequent challenge thus far has been the uneven and slow 
implementation of agreed EU measures.369 This challenge stems from the inability of the 
EU to mandate implementation in the timing and manner most useful to the EU. Delays 
have occurred because of national preferences, priorities, and bureaucracies. 
Implementation has also been affected by public opinion reflecting that social issues are 
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of higher priority for national attention and resources.370 All these issues have made the 
fight against terrorism less thorough across the Union. These challenges are further 
exacerbated by the formidable task of tracking the extensive list of actions, with limited 
coordination among the Member States and the small staff afforded the Counterterrorism 
Coordinator.371 Most of the problems in the EU’s counterterrorism effort stem from 
sources that the EU in its current form cannot remedy. These problems will carry over 
into the new Strategy, limiting its efficiency and effectiveness.  
D. STRATEGIC PROSPECTS 
The EU endeavors to be an effective means towards closer European integration 
benefiting both its member nations and its citizens. The choice to create strategies to 
focus EU efforts towards these ends shows a serious intent to move forward. The role of 
the EU remains nonetheless limited by the organizational constraints that protect national 
prerogatives in the areas of security and law enforcement. The role of the EU as merely 
facilitator to these ends precludes its ability to enact any strategy in the traditional sense. 
The EU intent in using the term “strategy” seems to be more geared towards laying down 
the concepts from which the Member States will act. In this way, the EU provides tools 
and guidelines; but in the end, the document does not fit the traditional notion of a 
strategy. 
1. Evidence of Strategic Potential 
As analyzed, the EU Strategy holds potential to positively affect the fight against 
terrorism. The document relays its intent and backs up that intent with EU-wide action. 
The overarching strategic commitment serves as a clear, concise message for public 
understanding of the EU effort. This commitment also serves as a reminder to Member 
States of the shared commitment to fight terrorism and in such a way as to preserve the 
democratic principles they hold dear. The prominence of human rights protection serves 
to quell concerns over counterterrorism measures toppling civil liberties. The “key 
priorities”372 set apart from the multitudes of items in the action plans feature these items 
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as critical to the Strategy’s execution. Moreover, the decision to publish this commitment 
in a document called a “strategy” calls attention to its overall perceived importance. The 
contribution of the document to provide a focus for EU counterterrorism efforts is 
significant. At the very least, the Strategy provides the tools and the overarching 
framework to fight terrorism according to liberal democratic values.  
The collective aspect of the EU Strategy positively affects the degree of 
integration and coordinated action against terrorism. The EU’s “cycle of progressive 
institutionalization” gives some insight and credence to the declared aspirations to fight 
terrorism together.373 Unanimous EU actions against terrorism offer proof of the 
centralized decision-making mechanism, which make it highly potent as an element of 
effective counterterrorism strategy.374 In contrast to EU central decision-making is the 
decentralized execution through the Member States. Decentralized execution, which 
includes using multifunctional and multilateral approaches, reinforces the EU’s alignment 
with acknowledged counterterrorism best practices. The broad range of counterterrorism 
measures taken to build the current EU approach boosts potential for combating 
terrorism, as does the EU’s broad foundation of international partners. The integrated 
nature of the EU provides for significant collective political will within the existing EU 
structure and across actions and allies. The EU Strategy and approach to fighting 
terrorism embodies several of the attributes deemed by experience as necessary to combat 
terrorism effectively. 
2. Missing Pieces 
In contrast, the EU Strategy also reveals sincere deficits in fighting terrorism. The 
intended goal, as stated, is neither precise nor measurable. The threat is not given enough 
detailed attention to provide a complete picture of what the Strategy is to fight, and 
furnishes an unusually light treatment of the most serious threat of WMD terrorism. 
Underpinning this weakness is the lack of a unified intelligence capability within the EU  
 
 
                                                 
372 Council, “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 14469/4/05 REV 4, 9, 11, 14, and 
16. 
373 Pastore et al., “Is There a European Strategy against Terrorism?,” 5.  
374 Den Boer, 9/11 and the Europeanisation, 19. 
81 
from which an actual threat assessment could be produced and pursued. These 
weaknesses impair the Strategy’s ability to forge a robust campaign to fight terrorism 
globally.  
Other missing pieces that preclude an optimistic perspective of the EU Strategy 
involve challenges to implementation. “The EU is not a federal state, and lacks the 
mandate to fight terrorism—it can only coordinate actions.”375 The EU is reliant upon the 
Member States to supply the resources and to implement actions, and to do so in 
compliance with the EU’s democratic principles. Political will may decline when a 
Member State is obligated to implement actions that are inconsistent with national 
experiences, or with more pressing national priorities. National interpretations and 
implementation timelines create an uneven cluster of counterterrorism measures, 
uncertain in their actual efficacy. Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt explain, “While 
progress has been made in the fight against terrorism, current policies and tools are not 
adequately developed to counter the new terrorism.”376 The EU decentralized structure 
endures numerous problems with implementing EU actions quickly or consistently. The 
result is an uncertain conglomeration of activities with incidental potential for success.  
3. Future Prospects 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy has many areas in which it fulfills 
counterterrorism best practices, and several areas in which it does not. J. Wouters and F. 
Naert assert, “The EU has for a long time believed that the so-called ‘piecemeal’ 
approach in the negotiation and conclusion of antiterrorism conventions is the most 
successful way to proceed.”377 The TEU provides the necessary means for the Member 
States to pursue a “truly integrated and coherent anti-terrorist policy.”378 This document 
“binds the EU to a single long-term counterterrorism strategy.”379 Notwithstanding its 
shortcomings, this Strategy is another milestone in the deepening of EU integration.  
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However, with the various missing pieces, the EU must realize the limitations of 
this document. It simply is not a complete strategy. Its transition into a complete strategy 
would require changes in the EU institutional structure to enable it to function with top-
down authority; this is not the manner in which the ESDP functions. Any far-reaching 
divergence from intergovernmental decision-making in the second and third pillar is 
highly unlikely because it would impose on the sovereignty of the Member States. 
However, even with its limited prospects to positively affect terrorism, the Strategy 
remains a building block for EU integration.  
The highest potential for this Strategy lies in maturation and collective learning of 
EU efforts. It is a process that has already begun with the evolution of action plans. As 
more actions are implemented by Member States and integration is deepened ever more, 
the current gaps in implementation will start to fill in. EU agencies involved in fighting 
terrorism will continue to establish themselves and their expertise. As these elements 
mature, they will learn and become more effective.380 Given no significant shifts in 
power within the EU structure, the collective learning will become the enhancing feature 
of the EU approach, making EU action more concerted and coordinated, and potentially 
leading to increased effectiveness. From the EU perspective, the Strategy is desirable. 
Despite its limitations, akin to the evaluation of the ESS,381 it does function well as a 
strategic concept, providing a general vector and a breadth of counterterrorism measures. 
With the EU Strategy guiding Member State actions, and Member States implementing 
them, a new collective body of knowledge and experience will emerge both at the 
institutional level and between Member States. This collective knowledge will “reflect 
cumulative experience in the field—a kind of counter-terrorism handbook.”382 This will 
constitute the EU Strategy’s utility and effectiveness.  
It remains to be seen how the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy will evolve. The 
strengths and weaknesses in the document do not imply that it will survive serious 
challenges or endure for a long period of time. The continued integration of the EU will 
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certainly put more meaning behind the wealth of counterterrorism actions. However, the 
Strategy remains vulnerable to unforeseen events that will trigger new but potentially 
different directions in the EU’s fight against terrorism or against a new or next generation 
threat. The criteria mentioned here will likely remain the same to determine potential 
effectiveness of the Strategy or any successor. What will likewise remain the same is the 
critical determination of what role the EU chooses to play in its evolution as a 
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